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Although the reform effort in Bulgaria is almost a decade old, until recently it was marked by
fluctuating level of commitment of rapidly succeeding governments. As a result, despite
isolated achievements (such as the passage of the new market-supportive Constitution in
1991, enactment of numerous market-friendly laws, price, trade and foreign exchange
liberalization, restitution of property and de-monopolization of the large enterprise sector), the
Government’s failure to contain fiscal deficit and address structural problems in the state
enterprise and banking sectors in a sustainable manner culminated in a fiscal crisis at the end
of 1996. The economic crisis precipitated political protests that brought down the Government
and resulted in dissolution of the Parliament in December 1996. Following the brief tenure of
4an interim Government, the current majority party, the UDF, was elected in April 1997 with a
reform platform that included promises to combat corruption and organized crime.
The current Government has made a strong, emphatic commitment to a variety of reforms
throughout the public and private sectors, as evidenced by the adoption of a program entitled
"Bulgaria 2001," which defines the principal guidelines for the development of the country
until the year 2001. "Bulgaria 2001" reflects the Government’s commitment to fulfilling its
reform platform and achieving four interrelated objectives: (i) preparing Bulgaria for
membership in the European Union (EU) by bringing Bulgaria’s laws and institutions in
compliance with EU standards; (ii) facilitating sustainable development and growth of the
private sector; (iii) realigning government and strengthening public institutions, including the
courts, in line with the needs of a market economy; and (iv) developing appropriate
mechanisms for combating and eliminating opportunities for corruption and crime. The
Government recognizes that its success in achieving these objectives will depend, in large
measure, on its ability to develop legitimate and well-functioning public and legal institutions
that would develop, implement and enforce Bulgaria’s laws and provide effective
mechanisms for addressing corruption. Indeed, one of the most important functions of the
state is to provide an institutional infrastructure that assures property rights and enforcement
of contractual claims, law and order, mechanisms for resolution of disputes, and rules that
encourage efficient long-term investment. If the private sector does not trust the state to
enforce rules governing business activities, investment and development of the private sector
will suffer. If high levels of corruption are present, most reforms will be subverted or not
implemented.
The twin priorities of strengthening the administrative capacity of the law-enforcement and
judicial authorities and of taking active measures to combat corruption must form an
important part of Bulgaria’s pre-accession strategy, as identified in the 1997 opinion of the
European Commission (EC) on Bulgaria’s application for membership. The Opinion noted
that in the short term (i.e. 1998) Bulgaria needs to take "concrete steps to combat corruption".
In the medium term, "improved operation of the judicial system", "reinforcement of justice
and home affairs institutions to improve their efficiency and effectiveness and embedding
respect for the rule of law", "implementation of the fight against organized crime and
corruption" were identified.
Since coming into office, the Government has taken a number of specific steps in order to
address the issues of public administration, the judiciary and corruption. These include
preparation of the legal framework for realigning public administration, including the Law on
Public Administration, Civil Service Act, Access to Information Law, and revisions to the
Law on Normative Acts and Public Procurement Act. The National Assembly is also
preparing a Law on Financial Reporting which will apply to all high level officials. Laws that
directly impact on the operation and efficiency of court proceedings are also being revised,
including the Civil Procedure Code, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. In
addition, in July of 1998, the Council of Ministers established The Center for Information
Technology, tasked with developing a unified computerized information system, tackling first
criminal law enforcement issues and later expanding it to include the civil justice system.
Such initiative will be an important tool in improving the administration of justice.
Specific anti-corruption measures are also being undertaken by the National Assembly, the
Government and the NGO community. Following the report of the Temporary Anti-
Corruption Commission of the National Assembly, on December 12, 1997, the National
Assembly issued a Decision which established a permanent legislative commission to combat
5crime and corruption and obliged the Council of Ministers to create a national strategy to
counteract crime. Pursuant to this Decision, on July 16, 1998, the Council of Ministers issued
the National Strategy that includes specific plans to combat organized crime, corruption,
engender criminal policy and political power reforms, improve civil justice procedures and
improve human resources for the justice system, including training. In addition, a group of
NGOs, assisted by international donors, including USAID, produced, together with members
of Parliament and judges, an anti-corruption action plan set out in a report entitled Coalition
2000.
Recognizing the complexities of designing and implementing the challenging transformation
of its public sector and the judiciary and tackling corruption, in early 1998 the Government
requested the assistance of the Bank and other international bodies. In response, the Bank is
reviewing the Government's program and needs in the areas of public administration and
judicial reform, taking into account the assistance that can be offered in this area by other
donors, including the EU and USAID. As part of this effort, a combined Bank/USAID
mission to Bulgaria took place in October 1998 to conduct a diagnostic assessment of
Bulgaria's judiciary. As a result of the mission, the USAID design team prepared a report
entitled "Judicial Strengthening in Bulgaria".
The present report sets out the Bank's findings on the main problems faced by Bulgaria's
judicial system today. It is divided into four main sections: (1) the legal framework for the
functioning of Bulgaria's judiciary (which includes a summary of constitutional provisions
governing the judiciary and the structure of the courts and discusses the manner of court
oversight and administration); (2) factors contributing to inefficiency in the court system; (3)
problems relating to enforcement of civil judgments; and (4) access to justice and public
perception of the judiciary. Measures for improvement are suggested in each of these sections
as appropriate.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF BULGARIA’S JUDICIAL
SYSTEM
Since 1991, significant reforms have been undertaken to convert Bulgaria’s judiciary from its
ineffective role under a totalitarian regime to an essential institution in a market economy.
Under the communist regime, the judiciary was little more than an arm of Party direction and
control. Judges and prosecutors were hired for their ability to follow orders, and not for their
independence of thought or high level of training. Parties to lawsuits knew the expected result
of litigation from the start of a case, whether civil or criminal.
After the political turmoil and the adoption of a new Constitution in 1991, the judicial branch
was recognized as a separate and independent entity. However, little structural or
management reform took place at that time. Legislation was passed in 1991which created a
separate Constitutional Court. Since the change in government in early 1997, some structural
and substantive legal reforms have occurred, including the establishment of an intermediate
Court of Appeals.
The GOB is aware that the judiciary is viewed by the public as an extremely corrupt and
inefficient organ. The Bulgarian government has recognized the need for far more substantial
reforms in the judicial branch and has taken some action toward effecting changes in the
judicial branch. A summary of the Government’s program to date is set out in Annex V to this
report.
6This section sets out the existing legal and institutional framework for operation of Bulgaria’s




The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria provides that the country will be governed
by the rule of law. The government is divided into three independent branches: the National
Assembly is a unicameral legislature; the executive branch includes a Prime Minister and a
Council of Ministers; and the judicial branch consists of three parts: the judges of various
levels of courts, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the investigating magistrates, who are all
governed by the Supreme Judicial Council. The Constitution also established a separate
Constitutional Court outside the judiciary.
The judicial branch is specifically recognized to be independent of the other branches of
government, including a separate budget. Pursuant to Article 117 (2), "[t]he judicial branch
shall be independent. In the performance of their functions, all judges, court assessors [jurors],
prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall be subservient only to the law" and (3) [T]he
judicial branch of government shall have an independent budget". According to Article 129 of
the Constitution, "[j]ustices, prosecutors, and investigating magistrates shall be elected,
promoted, demoted, reassigned and dismissed by the Supreme Judicial Council." This
independence is further recognized pursuant to Article 129, Section 3, "[j]ustices, prosecutors,
and investigating magistrates shall become unsubstitutable upon completing a third year in the
respective office. They shall be dismissed only upon retirement, resignation, upon
enforcement of a prison sentence for a deliberate crime, or upon lasting actual disability to
perform their functions over more than one year."
An even more unusual clause provides that "[j]ustices, prosecutors, and investigating
magistrates shall enjoy the same immunity as the Members of the National Assembly". This
immunity is described as follows: "A Member of the National Assembly shall be immune
from detention or criminal prosecution except for the perpetration of a grave crime, when a
warrant from the National Assembly or, in between its sessions, from the Chairman of the
National Assembly, shall be required. No warrant shall be required when a Member is
detained in the course of committing a grave crime; the National Assembly or, in between its
session, the Chairman of the National Assembly, shall be notified forthwith." In addition,
"[t]he immunity of a judge, prosecutor, or investigating magistrate shall be lifted by the
Supreme Judicial Council only in the circumstances established by law".
 
B. The Judicial System
Prior to 1998, the court system was divided into Regional courts of first instance; District
courts (of first instance for more serious civil and criminal cases, otherwise an appellate court)
and two Supreme Courts, the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative
Court. In order to bring itself in line with EU requirements, Bulgaria created a new appellate
level of courts in early 1998 to ensure that, in all cases, there was a three-tier system. The
current structure of the Bulgarian court system is represented diagramatically below. A









C. Oversight and Financing of the Court System
All three parts of the judicial branch (judges, prosecutors and investigative magistrates) are
governed by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). The Supreme Judicial Council is made up
of 25 members, eleven elected by the National Assembly, eleven elected by the bodies of the
judicial branch, the two Chairmen of the Supreme Courts of Cassation and Administration,
and the Chief Prosecutor. The SJC is chaired by a non-voting member, the Minister of Justice.
The main functions of the SJC are: (i) preparation and submission to the National Assembly
for approval of the annual budget for the judicial branch; and (ii) appointment, election,
promotion, demotion, reassignment and dismissal of judges, prosecutors and investigative
magistrates. The members of the Supreme Judicial Council who are judges each have their
own caseload and administrative responsibilities within their own judicial branch offices.
They have only a handful of clerical staff to assist them in their SJC responsibilities. While
the SJC plans on being fully computerized by the end of 1998, it does not have a coordinated
record-keeping system for its responsibilities at this time.
While the MOJ has no direct supervisory or administrative authority over the judicial branch
it plays a related role in the administration of justice. The Minister of Justice chairs the SJC
meetings and can, therefore, exercise control over the SJC agenda. The MOJ is also
responsible for three important aspects of the functioning of the courts. First, the MOJ is
responsible for the upkeep and repair of court facilities. Second, MOJ is responsible for
training of judges and court personnel. Third, the MOJ, through its Inspectorate department,
conducts semi-annual inspections of the courts, designed to track civil and criminal cases
through the lower courts and to ensure that all mandated standards regulating the progression
of a case through the courts have been met.
An analysis of the manner in which the SJC and MOJ perform their respective functions in
connection with court oversight and administration reveals serious deficiencies that
undermine the efficiency of the judicial branch. Specifically, while the SJC has a broad-based
8administrative mandate, it lacks the resources and capacity to execute its functions. The MOJ,
on the other hand, appears to have resources, but does not at present utilize those resources for
the optimal functioning of the system. The following analysis of court financing, ethics,
personnel matters and disciplinary procedures illustrates the urgent need to strengthen and to
allocate appropriate resources to the body, constitutionally charged with the oversight and
administration of the court system, namely the SJC.
 
The Ministry of Justice’s Inspection Function
The MOJ’s Inspectorate Department conducts six month reviews on each set of courts below
the Supreme Court level. The basic mandate of the Inspectorate Department is to review the
administration of civil and criminal cases. In the process of these regular on-site inspections,
statistical data is collected to ensure that all legal requirements are met.
There are three major drawbacks to the current inspection system:
the data is manually collected
Because there is no central computer database for the court system, information is maintained
in a variety of fashions, often in duplicative logbooks, and the data maintained is not very
reliable. Nor is the data coordinated with that maintained by other parties to the justice
system, such as police, prosecutors, and investigators.
the data is very limited in nature
For example, information is strictly maintained as to whether criminal cases are filed within
the three day statutory period once a person is incarcerated, and whether the case is resolved
either before or after three months (based on another statutory requirement). But no data is
kept on how long cases are kept in the system after the three month period, nor on the reasons
for any such delay.
little follow-through on reports
Information is collected by the MOJ and reported to the SJC, but since these bodies are
separate, there is little follow-through on the reports. Within the judicial branch, the original
disciplinary responsibility devolves to the President (chief judge) of the particular regional,
district, or appellate court. This individual may choose to further investigate a matter and to
impose some administrative sanction, or may do nothing, depending on their personal choice.
There is no regular reporting mechanism back to either the SJC or to the MOJ to determine
whether any additional disciplinary or other corrective measures were taken at the lower level.
The first of the problems identified above was brought into stark focus last year when a
scandal erupted in the national press regarding the referral, handling, and disposition of
criminal cases. Statistics maintained by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) showed that of all
police referrals on criminal matters, only one and one-half percent of cases were brought to
the disposition stage in court. The MOJ’s statistics were only marginally better, showing that
eight percent of all criminal matters reached the disposition stage in court. Whilst neither set
of statistics reflected well on the functioning of the judicial system, the discrepancy in the
statistics could not be properly reconciled because the parties’ systems (MOI’s and MOJ’s)
were not coordinated.
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1. Financing of the Judicial Branch
The Constitution clearly states that the judicial branch will have an independent budget. The
SJC submits an annual budget request to the National Assembly. The SJC conducts this
annual obligation without any staff expertise, and based on the information and requests sent
to them by the individual presiding judges of each of the individual courts in the court system.
The general budget for the courts is awarded by the National Assembly to the SJC, which then
divides the money between the judges, the prosecutors, and the National Investigative
Service. Currently, the Chief Prosecutor and the Director of the NIS then decide how the
money will be used for their independent groups. The money for the courts is divided by the
SJC between the presidents of each court system, who each make independent decisions on
the use of funds (aside from fixed expenses such as salaries). There is therefore no centralized
control over the funds once they are disbursed within a particular budget year, and no system
by which the individual courts report back on their expenditures. Several regions have
managed to squeeze a few computers and software out of regular budget funds, but the
decision to do so, and as to what to buy and how to use it, are made independently by each
court.
An expert budgetary staff is urgently needed by the SJC, to deal with properly funding regular
judicial branch expenses, to assist in special projects, and to permit centralized planning for
the branch in order to respond to new national priorities. Very few, if any, of the members of
the SJC possess this kind of expertise, and they each have a myriad of other obligations to
fulfil. Without the development of an expert staff, the SJC cannot be expected to do a
competent job at budgetary development.
2. Planning and Statistics
As part of its mandate, the MOJ Inspectorate Department collects statistics of various sorts on
each of the court system. The data collected by the MOJ does not however assist in providing
an overall picture of the functioning of the courts that could be useful to SJC in fulfilling its
own mandate.
There is no collated information on the numbers of computers in each of the courts, or
whether, and how particular courts use computers for record-keeping. One reason for this
particular lack of information is that courts are permitted to accept "gifts" or "loans" of
computer equipment and software from private sources. Some courts have accepted
computers from banks and law firms who appear regularly in cases before those courts,
thereby raising conflict of interest and corruption issues, while other presiding judges have
squeezed money for computers out of budgetary items slated for building repairs. In addition,
different regional courts have developed different software packages for court administration,
and then sometimes try to "sell" this package to other court systems.
Statistical information on court costs, including operating expenses and salaries, is collected
by the MOJ Inspectorate Department. The MOJ also collects information on court facilities
and equipment, and it is the MOJ which is responsible for the upkeep and repair of court
facilities (although the presiding judges handle the daily details of arranging repairs and other
maintenance and each court pays a small percentage of its budget into a "buildings fund").
Information is not collected on how many computers there are in the various courts nor what
various kinds of software are used for either case management or for legal research.
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The lack of computerization and standardized administrative and case maintenance software
within the court system, and the lack of a manual substitute creates a bureaucratic nightmare.
Information is not reasonably certain on numbers of cases assigned, the kind of cases, the
length of cases, and their disposition. Without this information, the individual professionals in
the judicial branch cannot be reasonably supervised, either for competence or corruption. Nor
can reviews of these issues be done on a system-wide basis, since neither the SJC nor the
MOJ collect sufficient information.
There is also little or no coordination for future planning for any of the three parts of the
judiciary. The SJC has the responsibility for the budget, but has no staff with budgetary
expertise. The MOJ has staff with inspectorate and budget expertise, but does not have
authority to make related budget or staffing decisions except for buildings and training. Nor




All judges in Bulgaria are appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council. For the Regional
courts, a judge must have at least two years of experience in the legal profession; for the
District courts, five years. Judges will typically serve their first two years as "junior judges" in
the District courts. This is a two-year term during which the junior judge will hear cases
together with two fully-fledged District court judges on the bench. The Presidents of each of
the courts are also appointed by the SJC.
As described in more detail in the USAID report, law graduates are required to serve an
"apprenticeship year", structured according to which branch of the legal profession a
candidate wishes to pursue. For those pursuing a judicial career, the apprenticeship year is
split between the District and Regional courts. At the end of this year, all trainee lawyers and
judicial candidates come together for a state examination organized by the Ministry of Justice.
The findings of the USAID report suggest that the content of this examination appears to be
open to question in terms of rigor and relevance to ultimate job performance.
In addition to these examination criteria, all judicial candidates must: (1) be Bulgarian
citizens; (2) have no criminal record; and (iii) possess the "required moral and professional
qualities". At the present time, no systematic background checks on judicial branch candidates
and on the clerical staff for the judicial system are performed. There is also no systematic
determination made as to the character of people who apply for judgeships. When this is
coupled with the lack of job descriptions and lack of regular supervision, it is clear that this is
one reason that there are serious problems within the judiciary as to incompetence and
corruption.
b. Remuneration
Despite the fact that all Judicial Branch professionals obtain blanket job security after a three
year probationary period, and also receive both civil and criminal immunity at that point, a
large percentage of people leave these positions for private practice or other positions after a
few years. These jobs are very poorly paid, with salary ranges of approximately $120 to $240
in U.S. dollars. The best-paid private lawyers receive between $80 and $100 per hour, and it
is fairly common for private lawyers to receive about this amount per day. Almost any lawyer
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can make more money than judges, prosecutors, or investigators. Newly-published statistics
show that the average wage for all workers in Bulgaria is about $122 per month.?
The average judge’s and prosecutor’s salary is barely enough to meet the usual housing/rent
costs in Sofia. All other basic expenses and any "extras" must be paid from a non-salary
source. While some prosecutors and judges rely on spouses or professorships to meet these
expenses, it is quite common for judicial branch personnel to accept bribes in order to feed
their families.
The consequence of the extremely low pay, when added to the deep lack of respect for the
Judicial Branch employees and the poor working conditions, are many-fold. First, few highly
competent lawyers are attracted to this work. Second, many of the competent Judicial Branch
professionals spend a few years learning everything they can about the judicial system, and
then leave the judiciary for higher paid jobs. Third, according to strong anecdotal information,
those who stay often resort to corruption in order to meet their basic living expenses. There
remains a very small cadre of extremely dedicated and competent professionals who are
strong supporters of change in the Judicial Branch. The large balance of remaining Judicial
Branch employees are often not motivated to move their caseloads along, are not well-trained
or otherwise informed about the law, or are directly susceptible to bribery.
This problem is equally great for the supporting clerical and administrative staff. Without
exception, all of the judges interviewed strongly complained about the lack of competent and
honest staff. The support staff is not properly trained in its functions, is not motivated to serve
as part of a system which resolves disputes, is paid extremely low salaries, and does not have
a proper civil service program in place to resolve disciplinary issues. It is commonly known
that clerks are paid small sums to hide files or to move files up on a judge’s calendar, and that
larger sums are paid for a file to be completely lost. No efforts are made to retain or reward
competent staff. Their working conditions are poor, especially in the busier court systems.
Nor are the judges able to terminate incompetent workers without facing myriad civil and
administrative claims, since there are no civil service standards yet in place.
The proposed amendment to the Judicial Powers Act also contains provisions as to the
minimum salary for judges. The minimum salary for an entry level judge would be fixed at
twice the national average public sector salary, plus a clothing and housing allowance. Whilst
this is a move in the right direction in an environment of tight budget constraints, it would do
little to bring the judicial career the esteem and the caliber of personnel it deserves.
c. Staffing
Determinations of staffing levels within the judiciary are ultimately made by the Supreme
Judicial Council, after input and requests by presiding judges, the Chief Prosecutor, and the
Director of the National Investigative Service. Staffing and related budgetary issues are
addressed by the SJC in an annual budget request to the National Assembly, with assistance
from the Ministry of Justice on buildings and training issues. The SJC does not have any
expert staff to assist in these determinations or other administrative planning, and the budget
and staffing requests depend on the tenacity or connections of the presiding judge or other
supervisor rather than a systematic assessment of the needs of the particular offices or courts.
d. Promotions
There appears to be no set policy for promotion of judges, prosecutors, or investigators. A
decision has just been made to require job categorization, systemic enforcement of
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qualifications for employment, and regular standards for promotion and discipline of
government personnel under the new Civil Service Law. No one could state with certainty
that the civil service reforms would be applied to Judicial Branch personnel (although it was
stated that it would apply to court clerical and other support staff). Notwithstanding the doubt
surrounding its applicability, it is anticipated that the SJC will adopt similar principles for
promotion and discipline for judges, prosecutors and investigators within a reasonable period
of time. At this point, promotions are granted in a haphazard fashion, and are as often based
on political and family connections as they are on levels of knowledge and experience.
e. Ethics and Disciplinary Procedures
The SJC has the clear constitutional responsibility and right to supervise and discipline all
judicial branch employees. However, there is no regular bureaucratic system through which
disciplinary matters are reported and investigated, nor is there a clear set of guidelines for the
conduct of employees. Additionally, the SJC does not have staff experts or personnel whose
responsibility would be to deal with disciplinary cases.
The Bulgarian Judges Association has produced a set of guidelines for judges, but these rules
are voluntary and would apply only to the members of the BJA. A corresponding prosecutor’s
association has not produced ethical standards, nor are there written standards of conduct for
investigators. Since these judicial employees are so poorly paid that they are commonly recent
law school graduates with little practical experience, and since they receive little training (and
no training on ethics), the usual result is that a variety of ethical breaches (by Western
standards) are quite common. There is also very substantial anecdotal information that case
decisions are commonly resolved through bribery of the judges, court administrative
personnel, prosecutors, and investigators. In fact, one judge jokingly mentioned that judges
are less corrupt than the other groups, simply because they are at the end of the time line for
case procedure, after bribes have already been paid to dismiss cases or "lose" files.
The president of each court is responsible for reporting disciplinary matters to the SJC, where
the president has determined that specific disciplinary measures are warranted, but without
standards or administrative support for this function, this step is very rarely taken. There is a
common saying in Bulgaria, "A crow does not pick out the eye of another crow." This
sentiment demonstrates one of the reasons for the lack of referrals to the SJC. Another strong
reason for the lack of disciplinary measures is that few judges desire to expose the corruption
or inefficiency of their colleagues for fear that attention will be turned to their own conduct.
Without an administrative structure and standardized rules of conduct, there is little impetus
or pressure to refer judges or other judicial branch personnel for serious discipline.
As described above, while an inspectorate function is carried out by the Ministry of Justice,
this function is not directly connected to the review of disciplinary matters. Neither the
Judicial Branch nor the Ministry of Justice carries out an internal affairs function, resulting in
a complete lack of review for internal corruption matters. This situation has partly contributed
to the public view of an unmanaged and corrupt Judicial Branch.
A serious block to dealing with criminal activity by judicial branch personnel is the criminal
immunity provided for them under the Constitution. Serious criminal matters would have to
be referred for criminal investigation and prosecution, yet no charges may be brought against
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any judicial branch professional unless the crime involved is a "grave" one (only the most
serious felonies, of which bribery is not one), and unless the SJC gives permission to lift the
immunity. This has virtually never happened.
According to members of the National Assembly, this "protection" was put into place because
of some glaring instances of political maneuvering through criminal charges against various
public officials. In their view, the judicial system is so weak that it cannot provide the normal
kinds of protections against false claims or accusations. Additionally, without the public
administration reforms, including the civil service legislative reforms and proposed changes
in the substantive criminal law in place, those who abuse the system to bring specious charges
against public officials cannot be punished, even administratively. While legislators,
executive branch personnel, and some members of the judiciary generally agree that these
immunities cause very serious problems, as a group they are not willing to take steps to
remove these criminal immunities until other protective reforms are in place.
 
Opportunities for Corruption
The lack of sufficient national record-keeping and administrative follow-up also contributes to
corruption. The SJC doesn’t have staff to handle either statistical information or
administrative supervision, and the MOJ does not collect data which would permit reviews of
job performance or actions/delays in specific cases, nor does it have supervisory authority
over the judicial branch. The presiding judges of the court systems have a variety of
administrative duties, as well as their own caseload, and also have no administrative staff to
support a thorough review of the caseloads of the other judges. Nor is there any modern
docketing system for case files. The result is a lack of systemic administrative support or
supervision of the judicial branch.
One consequence of this situation is that judges, prosecutors and investigators who decide to
resolve cases corruptly can do so with the high probability that their actions will be neither
reviewed nor questioned. According to strong anecdotal information, this kind of corruption is
more common than the resolution of cases on the basis of the facts and applicable law.
 
D. POSSIBLE STRENGTHENING MEASURES
The SJC, as overseer of the judicial branch, must have the capacity to fulfil its mandate. As a
first priority in a judicial reform program, the SJC requires fundamental institutional
strengthening. This will involve allocation of additional budgetary resources to allow SJC to
expand its staff to include appropriate professional support staff in finance, planning, statistics
and personnel matters. SJC would also require additional material resources to fulfil its
function appropriately (office space and equipment). The SJC will also require technical
assistance in designing a strategic plan to address the needs of the judicial branch, including
in some of the areas outlined below. In addition, in order to improve the functioning of the
system as a whole, greater coordination will be required between the SJC and MOJ,
particularly with reference to the inspectorate function.
 
1. Strengthening the SJC in order to:
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develop its administrative capacity in budgetary matters and formalizing its supervisory and
planning functions by expanding its support to include professionals in these areas;
develop transparent criteria for the hiring, promotion, and disciplinary system of judges,
prosecutors, and investigators;
obtain expert staff to determine adequate physical needs for each of the courts and other
offices (encompassing buildings and computers), and seek sufficient budgetary funds to meet
these needs.
develop a regularized disciplinary system and standards of conduct for all judiciary branch
personnel, including a process to lift criminal immunity where proper; it should also develop
an expert staff to deal with disciplinary matters on a regular and standardized basis. This staff
should conduct its own inspections of the offices and courts within the Judicial Branch, which
would coordinate with or replace the Ministry of Justice inspection function.
establish an internal affairs structure to handle internal corruption investigations on an on-
going basis for all parts of the judiciary.
2. A study be carried out to determine how criminal and civil immunity issues are dealt with
in other countries, in order to decide if additional steps can be taken to deal with the existence
of these barriers to dealing with misconduct/crimes.
3. In order to ensure greater coordination between MOJ and SJC, a systemic review be carried
out of the data required to be collected by the courts and then monitored through MOJ’s
Inspectorate Department. SJC should review the type of data that should be collected and
maintained by the courts in order to show the working and efficiency of the court system and
to monitor personnel issues such as disciplinary measures. Given the sensitivity of some of
this information, consideration should be given to how this information should be monitored
by SJC, as clearly some of these issues rightly fall outside the mandate of the MOJ Inspection
function.
4. A study be carried out in order to determine a satisfactory pay scale for all Judicial Branch
employees The Bank Team would recommend an approach of linking judicial salaries to
those of legislators, and raising all other judicial branch salaries accordingly. This approach
was recently adopted by the Georgian government in it’s judicial reform efforts.
III. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INEFFICIENCY OF THE COURT
SYSTEM
A. Case Load Management
The US AID report addresses very well the administration, management, and planning issues
facing the judicial branch The table below contains a summary of the weaknesses identified
by USAID on court administration. The full text of the USAID report is set out at Annex III to
this report.
 
Summary of reasons for Case Delays
Administrative and clerical burdens of all judges
Administrative burdens of Chairman of Courts
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Lack of legal research assistance and legal information software
Poor performance by court support staff
Lack of training of judges
Lack of work ethic among judges
Inability to quickly access information in criminal and civil codes
Complex summonsing process
Intentional delays by attorneys
Prolonged period for collection of evidence
Failure by witnesses to appear
Failure by judicial experts to appear
Workload associated with enterprise registration
Workload associated with high level of appeals
Absence of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
Based on USAID report
 
 
As described in greater detail in the USAID report, problems exist on all levels. On an
individual level, each judge has a variety of simple clerical duties to carry out; they must
answer their own phones, accept visitors scheduled and unscheduled, hand-write or type their
own correspondence and opinions (often on manual typewriters), conduct 100% of their own
legal research, and handle most of the docket scheduling issues, as well as bearing the
responsibility for the appearance of parties and witnesses for court hearings. This same
situation is generally true for the prosecutors and the investigators. It is estimated that
approximately 20% of an individual’s time is spent on clerical matters.
The presiding judges must handle all of these matters for their own caseloads, and must
additionally control and disburse the annual budget, contract for building maintenance and
repairs, assign cases, and handle any disciplinary matters, in addition to the general
supervision of the judges and court support personnel. It is estimated that 50 - 80% of a
presiding judge’s time is spent on administrative matters, depending on the particular court
system.
Many of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council are also Chairmen or Deputy
Chairmen of individual courts. As such each have their own caseload and administrative
responsibilities within their own judicial branch offices. But the SJC is also responsible for
handling the preparation of the annual judicial branch budget request and the discipline of
employees. They have only a handful of clerical staff members to assist in these
responsibilities. The SJC plans on being fully computerized by the end of this year, but does
not have a coordinated record-keeping system for its responsibilities at this time.
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One of the other reasons identified in the USAID report involves the conduct before the courts
of lawyers in private practice. Whilst the USAID report rightly recommends the need for the
courts to be able to impose sanctions for deliberate delaying tactics employed by lawyers, the
role of the Bulgarian Bar Association in developing a strong legal profession is examined in
the box below.
 
Intentional Delays by Lawyers
The USAID report identifies intentional delays by lawyers as one of the obstacles that can
delay court proceedings. Under the current system, a judge cannot impose any sanctions on
lawyers who abuse procedural rights. While the Law on Advocates sets rough guidelines for
the conduct of lawyers in private practice (e.g. not employ procrastinating techniques in court,
ban on trade advertising, limited conflict of interest rules). These standards are generally
viewed as being weak when measured against comparable international standards (for
example, the conflict of interest rules only apply to court representation and do not extend to
representing conflicting parties in the same business deal or even taking a personal stake in
business deals which should be negotiated solely for the client). The Law on Advocates also
establishes disciplinary procedures against lawyers.
Each lawyer in private practice must be registered with a regional Bar Association
(corresponding to the regional courts) and the national Bar Association. These are self-
financing independent bodies, however, given the low level of fees charged, the Bar
Associations may not be able to fully fulfil all their stated functions. Each Bar Association has
its own Disciplinary Court before which an aggrieved party can bring an action against a
lawyer. The Disciplinary Court can impose fines and/or temporary or indefinite suspension.
To date, most of the cases before the Disciplinary Courts have been brought by the Bar
Associations for failure to pay membership fees, with only some cases brought for negligence.
Virtually all sanctions imposed have been for failure to pay Bar Association fees.
Intentional Delays by Lawyers
In addition to the recommendation made by USAID to change the Civil Procedure Code to
provide for sanctions to be imposed by the courts on private lawyers, the Bulgarian Bar
Association could be provided assistance and training to develop a set of standards of conduct
for attorneys; the BBA could be provided training in the exercise of it’s disciplinary function
and a review undertaken of the financing needs for the proper exercise of these functions.
The lack of coordination within the judicial system and the lack of any information link
between the users of the court system and government agencies are both highlighted as
problems in the USAID report. It is not currently possible to follow a case from the police
complaint to the conclusion of a court case, nor to follow a convicted defendant through a
prison term or alternative punishment. Nor is there a civil docketing system which permits a
reasonable review of the civil justice system. This situation will be exacerbated by the
expected creation of the financial police within the MOF, which has its own computer and
software systems.
Even within the court system, there is no coordinated system for case management or for
court administration. While the maintenance of certain ledger books is mandated by law, there
is no centralized set of records through which case numbers, types, disposition, and length of
case are maintained or reviewed.
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The computerized case tracking system is a stated goal of the GOB; the Council of Ministers’
National Strategy to Counteract Crime has as one of its goals the creation of a computer
system which would track criminal (and later civil) cases from initiation by the police through
disposition of the case in court and any following imposition of sentence. The court records
would be one module of this broad unified system, which would also standardize the
statistical record keeping across all of the governmental parties involved in the justice system.
This system should include both a court record and file management system, and should
specifically include a docketing system.
 
Suggested Measures:
1. The judicial branch should set as a high priority the creation of the Uniform Information
System, which would initially be established for the criminal caseload, and would later be
expanded to the civil caseload. It should cooperate with the Council of Ministers in general,
and specifically with the MOJ, the MOI, and the Center for Information Technology to agree
on the bases for such a program, and to determine the hardware and software needs to support
the development of the system. Part of the development of this system would include a
common statistical system with the National Statistics Institute, to assist in pinpointing
problems and delays in the judicial system, and as a planning and supervision tool to develop
responses to those issues.
2. Following on from the pilot activities recommended by USAID in certain courts, the SJC
should develop a computerized case-tracking, file management, and docketing system which
will capture complete information on length of cases and manner of disposition at each stage
of a case.
3. The SJC and MOJ should conduct a complete review of each part of the judicial branch to
determine the computer assets owned in the courts and to evaluate the software systems
available to manage individual caseloads, to provide supervisory data, and to provide system-
wide data for administrative, management, and disciplinary decisions; in addition, this review
should be combined with an analysis of any physical modifications required to the court
buildings in order to provide the appropriate wiring for increased computerization.
4. As stated in the USAID report, the SJC should undertake a review of the needs of
individual judges for clerical assistance, and should prepare a plan to fulfill these needs. The
adoption of a computerized Uniform Information System will free up a large number of clerks
who currently maintain various ledger books. A training center could also be utilized to
retrain these support personnel to handle new administrative responsibilities. This review
should include all judicial branch offices and officers, not just the judges and courts.
5. The SJC should review the need to provide professional court administrator staff to
presiding judges (to be tested in a set of pilot courts), as recommended in the USAID report.
 
B. INADEQUATE COURT RESOURCES
1. Court Facilities
It is apparent that space constraints are a severe problem in Sofia where judges frequently
share an office with one or two other judges. This, clearly, prevents judges from performing
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to the best of their abilities. For many of the courts outside of Sofia, although the space
allocated appears adequate, the court buildings may require some modification in order to be
wired for a greater degree of computerization. An inventory of the space available to the
judiciary is required, so as to determine whether the problem of physical space in Sofia is a
prevalent problem throughout Bulgaria. Currently no statistics are maintained on the number
of occupants per office in the court buildings. The courts visited by the Bank team outside of
Sofia seemed spacious and no complaints were voiced as to working conditions.
In Sofia, the Bank team learned that the sections of the old Palace of Justice, currently used by
the National Museum, would be reclaimed in 1999. Given the needs for physical space in
Sofia and the need to increase the esteem in which the judiciary is held, the Government
would be urged to provide adequate space to allow the judges to efficiently discharge their
duties.
The Constitutional Court is housed in a section of the government building assigned to the
Council of Ministers. This physical proximity does not assist in a public perception of a clear
separation of powers. Ideally, the Constitutional Court should be located in it’s own building.
2. Legal Information
With the large volume of legislation enacted in recent years in Bulgaria, it is critical that the
judiciary have access to up-to-date legal information comprising laws, normative acts,
decisions of the Supreme Courts and other legal data. A lack of availability of current legal
information has not been identified as a problem for judges (or other legal practitioners) in
Bulgaria, nor was the prompt publication of laws and normative acts. There have been
numerous complaints about the access to translated laws (for foreigners) and the quality of
translations. The Ministry of Justice has plans to develop an "official" English translation of
statutes and regulations to assist in attracting foreign business. The MOJ is seeking financial
assistance in this endeavor.
A variety of sources of legal information is available to lawyers and judges, both in hard copy
and in software packages carrying varying price-tags. It is the decision of each individual
Court chairman which information sources will be available to the judges in his or her court.
A variety of loose-leaf compendia exist. The most widely used being the compendium of laws
and ordinances "Normativni Aktove" which is edited by the COM. This is updated on a
monthly basis.
A number of software packages are available on the market which vary in quality and in price.
The four most widely used systems are DIGESTA (considered to be the most complete and
reliable and carrying the highest price tag), APIS, CIELA and NORMA (the latter is state
owned, the rest are owned by private companies). Prices vary according to purchase price and
the frequency of updates. Few courts can afford to use DIGESTA (which is about twice the
price of the others) but many courts declare themselves quite satisfied with APIS.
3. Computer Needs
As recommended in Section III.A above (Caseload Management), a review should be
undertaken of the computers currently available in the courts including a review of their
compatibility with each other/other users of the judicial system and of the capacity of the
existing computers to run software packages in use in, and being developed for, the courts.
Recommendations
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Undertake an analysis of the physical space allocated to the courts with details of office space
allocated per judge and an assessment made of the wiring needs of the buildings for increased
computer use. (The MOJ maintains statistics on this data and an analysis as to adequacy of
space allocation could easily be carried out.) Set minimum standards of working conditions
and, in coordination with MOJ, develop a time-bound action plan for meeting this standard
for all judges.
The SJC should 1) establish a minimum level as to the information systems that should be
available in each court and 2) should play a centralized role in exploring if there would be any
economy of scale if the SJC played a coordinating role for the courts in acquiring software.
Undertake an analysis of the computers currently available in the court system and their
compatibility. Set minimum standards as to hardware available, and develop a time-bound
action plan for meeting this standard for all judges.
 
C. Registration Functions Performed by the Courts
The court system currently maintains the national registers of immoveables and of companies.
The Ministry of Justice maintains the national Register of Collateral. Annex II contains a
detailed description of the registration functions performed by the courts. Clearly, any attempt
to alleviate the pressure on the court system will need to look at whether the functions
performed by the courts are properly fulfilled by an independent judicial power rather than the
executive branch of Government.
The 1997 statistics maintained by the MOJ show that the average monthly number of civil
cases handled by a judge would fall from 25 cases to 10 if company registration were
removed from the courts. Clearly, removing this function, would alleviate the pressure on the
courts and, according to one judge, remove one lucrative source of petty corruption from the
judiciary. The impact of the loss of the registration fees would need to be determined. Another
alternative would be to simplify the registration process (and registration forms) so that
clerical staff could handle the process and, through a more automated procedure, some of the
opportunities for corruption would be reduced. Even under the current system it is not
apparent that judicial review of registration forms is necessary.
The subject of the proper location of the land registration function forms part of a separate
study in preparation for a Bank-supported, cadastre project.
 
Recommendations
? ?Simplify registration procedures (for land and companies) so that registration could be
handled by clerical staff.
? ?In the context of Bank project on Cadastre, consider whether land register should be
maintained in the courts.




D. Lack of Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Mechanisms
and Lack of Forum for Small Claims
The reforms in the judiciary could usefully be complemented by the creation and use of
modern alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, in particular private arbitration and the
development of a "small claims" court with simplified procedures and shorter deadlines.
These would provide efficient additional mechanisms for resolving civil disputes. There are




Bulgaria has allowed for private arbitration since 1953 when the Court of Arbitration at the
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was established, largely to meet the needs of
foreign trade. Although no restrictions exist, this remains the only permanent specialist
arbitration institution in the country. The Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(LICA) was enacted in 1988 and the Civil Procedure Code extended arbitration to domestic
cases in 1993. The law allows for both institutional and ad hoc arbitration and permits parties
to choose rules of procedure as well as the applicable law. Arbitration can be initiated only
with the prior written agreement of the parties. There are a number of disputes which cannot
be submitted to arbitration such as contracts of employment and administrative cases. An
amendment to the LICA is under preparation which includes, amongst its objectives, the
speeding up of the arbitration process and reducing the cost of arbitration. Arbitral awards can
be appealed to the Sofia City Court (the proposed amendment would change this to the Court
of Appeal) only on specific grounds, such as violations of arbitral procedures.
Arbitration allows for specialized business expertise to enter the resolution of commercial
conflicts. ADR can provide a cheaper method of dispute resolution and should alleviate the
pressure on the court system, decreasing caseloads. The Bulgarian Industrial Association has
taken some initial steps toward establishing its own arbitration court and is being advised by
ABA-CEELI in developing its own set of rules. All members of the judiciary interviewed
lamented the limited use of arbitration in Bulgaria to date and would eagerly encourage the
expansion of ADR possibilities in Bulgaria.
2. Mediation
There are a number of efforts underway to start mediation programs in Bulgaria. The most
significant has been started by an NGO called Partners Bulgaria (an affiliate of Partners for
Democratic Change). This NGO has developed mediator training programs (training of
mediators and training trainers in mediation) and has assisted in several successful mediations
(including one involving an international dispute over a franchise for manufacture of one of
Bulgaria’s famous beers, Astika). It has also developed a mediation program for the Bulgarian
Industrial Association. Partners Bulgaria employs a clinical training method for its training
courses which requires parties to participate in mock mediation exercises and evaluate their
performance. Also involved in mediation are business groups such as the Bulgarian
Association for Building Partnerships.
Possible Measures
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The use of ADR, especially commercial arbitration, should be supported through provision of
training to, and developing awareness of, businesses, lawyers and judges about the forms,
utility and advantages of ADR.
Within the court system, develop a "small claims" court with simplified procedures and
limited appellate rights.
Develop civil procedure or court rules to actively involve the court in encouraging resolution
of disputes through ADR – such as through court-ordered mediation. Courts need training in
how to integrate ADR into their own court management systems;
Institute mediation training in law school, and JTC/training in apprentice year, and consider
expanding training programs currently provided by NGOs. Training in mediation techniques
could usefully be extended to judges, lawyers and businesses.
 
E. Inadequate Training of Judicial Personnel
The USAID design team had, as its principal focus, a review of the needs in the area of
judicial training and legal education. In particular, the design team looked into three areas: the
need for a judicial training school; legal education generally; and the apprenticeship year for
judicial candidates. To avoid duplication of effort, the Bank team did not undertake any
separate review in this area but has provided comments to USAID on the draft report. Based
on the findings of the USAID report the present status of the judicial education process is
outlined below.
1. Training for New Judges
a. Law Faculties
The quality of judges can be directly affected by the quality of general legal education. This is
particularly true in a country like Bulgaria where one can go straight from university to being
a judge after a one year apprenticeship.
The issues faced by law faculties in Bulgaria cut across the entire higher education system. A
certain amount of reform has already occurred as a result of the Higher Education Act of 1995
(HEA) which has already brought about changes to the legal curriculum. The curriculum, as
described by the USAID team, appears suitable, comprehensive and comparable to curricula
in western European law faculties. The Bulgarian education system is a system which faces
many of the problems that many western European civil law systems have faced in their
recent evolution (i.e. moving away from strictly didactic teaching methods and limiting the
number of students admitted to popular faculties such as law). Whilst there has also been an
updating of teaching methods mandated by MOE, to introduce more interactive teaching
methods and to make practical training a larger part of the syllabus, it is not clear that this has
yet achieved any practical results.
The USAID team reported that there was a small number of "habilitated" law professors who,
by virtue of their qualifications and experience, have been granted authority by the State
Academic Qualifications Council to lecture at a certain level in the law faculty. Every law
faculty must have a certain number of these "habilitated" professors. As a result many of them
teach at more than one faculty. Consideration should be given to expanding the program to
"habilitate" an increased number of professors.
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USAID recognized their lack of comparative advantage in assisting in the reform of legal
education in a civil law system. To the extent the Government would benefit from assistance
in this area, civil law countries in the EU would be the optimal source for such assistance. As
part of such assistance, a diagnostic analysis should be carried out current law curriculum,
teaching methods, faculty qualification, terms and conditions of faculty employment, quality
of law faculty libraries and quality of teaching materials.
In addition, the Council of Ministers is using its power under the HEA to limit the number of
law students entering law faculties and other popular courses. It is reported that this power is
being used to shake out certain higher education establishments (the number of law faculties
has been reduced from 15 to 11). A National Evaluation and Accreditation Agency has been
established under the HEA and, by the end of 1998, all educational establishments must apply
for accreditation. If an institution fails to be accredited, it will lose state support. In this
regard, technical assistance could be provided to MOE in connection with the accreditation of
law faculties.
In order to graduate from university, law students take three compulsory State examinations.
These examinations are considered to be challenging and a good measure of the student’s
accomplishments. The exams cover Public Law, Civil Law and Procedure, and Criminal Law
and Procedure.
The Government therefore has, to a large extent, recognized problems in the Bulgarian higher
education system and is taking initial steps to improve it. The Bank team was also informed
that library facilities in law faculties are outdated and lacking in modern resources.
b. Apprenticeship Year
All judicial candidates must serve a one year apprenticeship period before starting their
professional life on the bench, as prosecutors or investigators. Law graduates are required to
spend one year as interns or residents, during which they should learn practical skills like
legal research and writing and the detailed procedural functioning of the courts. Apprentices
agree that this year is a waste of time for most. The skills learned during the apprenticeship
year are not adequate due to deficiencies in the apprenticeship program, stemming from: (i)
too many law school graduates seeking apprenticeships each year, resulting in space and
mentor time constraints, (ii) lack of incentives for the judges and other court employees to
devote the time and effort to providing the apprentices with useful experience, and (iii) too
many compulsory rotations through the court system to receive a meaningful experience in
any one "station".
The structure of the apprenticeship year is governed by Ministry of Justice Regulation No. 30
of February 29, 1996 which mandates strict rotations amongst various branches and arms of
the court system with some time spent in the district and regional courts, some time served
with judges, prosecutors and investigators and some time in the registries maintained at the
courts. The compulsory examination that all apprentices must pass at the end of the year
before they can become judges is considered inadequate in both rigor and content.
The USAID team makes recommendations for the strengthening of this year of training for
the judicial branch. The Bank supports these recommendations.
 
Judicial Apprentices – USAID Principal Recommendations
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carrying out of a major effort to strengthen the structure and content of the apprenticeship
year for judicial candidates taking into account not only the wishes of the judicial candidate
but also the needs of the judicial system
design a serious, comprehensive examination to be given to all apprentices at the end of the
year
consider a program of grants to one or more NGOs to work, in collaboration with MOJ, with
judicial candidates to help design a positive work experience
New judges, prosecutors, and investigating magistrates take office without any further formal
training beyond the apprenticeship year. Judges and most others serve in a "junior" capacity
for a period of time (for judges, this period extends for the first year), assisting more
experienced professionals, so that on-the-job training does occur.
 
3. Training for Existing Judges
There is no systematic program of continuing education for sitting judges. Such a program is
necessary under any system, particularly a system with new concepts and changing laws. Up
to now, no money has been budgeted by the SJC for this purpose. While the MOJ is
responsible for training of judicial personnel, it doesn’t have sufficient funds to do more than
an occasional seminar. New judicial branch personnel generally only receive on-the-job
training. The lack of continuing education for experienced judicial branch personnel is an
equally great problem, because of the flurry of legislation being generated by the legislature,
which result in a new and high demand for legal expertise in laws reflecting the transition to a
market economy. While basic training was provided to a small extent before 1997, the
government has cut these funds due to a lack of money.
This basic lack of training in substantive legal areas is exacerbated by a complete lack of
training on moral/ethical standards of conduct. Since judicial branch personnel are not well
educated on the applicable rules of law either substantively or ethically, and often have little
practical experience, it is a small wonder that corruption is so common.
4. Judicial Training Center
The Bank would, in general terms, endorse the USAID team’s recommendations for the
establishment of a judicial training center to be established and operated by an NGO,
comprising a coalition of members of the BJA, the MOJ and other legal NGOs. It is proposed
that this center provide training to existing judges and newly appointed judges. In the design
of the proposed JTC, consideration should be given to the target group for training; control
and content of the curriculum; and the financial viability of the structures proposed.
Exclusive attention should not only be focused on the judges’ training needs, whether in the
short or the long term. In this regard, the Bank would endorse the conclusion of the Ministry
of Justice regarding the importance of training for prosecutors, investigators, and clerical
staff. Constitutionally the prosecutors and the investigators are part of the judicial branch, and
planning decisions for the improvement of the judiciary must deal with these branches too. In
addition, while much of the training needs would best be met by separate classes, some
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substantive training can cost effectively be given to all of the judicial branch components
together.
The curriculum of the JTC would have to cover areas of identified weaknesses in judicial
performance. These could include the following specific areas: enforcement of judgments;
bankruptcy; basic business and accounting practices; mediation techniques, ethical standards
of conduct, financial criminal investigative practices; and cross disciplinary research and
decision writing. In addition, the ability of the SJC to influence the curriculum of the JTC
would have to be considered. Once strengthened, the SJC could, as part of its oversight
function, play an active role in assessing the training needs of the judiciary.
Based on the experience in other countries, there are a number of forms such a training center
could take (governmental/NGO run; residential/non-residential; permanent/transitory




A diagnostic analysis should be carried out by experts in legal education from civil law
countries within the EU to evaluate current law faculty curriculum, teaching methods, faculty
qualification, terms and conditions of faculty employment, quality of law faculty libraries and
quality of teaching materials.
Apprenticeship Year
Adopt USAID recommendations to strengthen and restructure the apprenticeship program for
judicial candidates.
Continuing Education
Establish a Judicial Training Center to address training needs of both existing and newly
appointed judges and other judicial professionals and support personnel. The ultimate design
of a JTC should take into account the target group for training; control and content of the
curriculum; and the financial viability of the structures proposed.
 
F. Poor Quality of Legislative Drafting
From the early 90‘s, Bulgaria has had to adapt its legislative framework to the needs of a
market economy. This resulted in the rapid enactment of a multitude of new laws and
regulations, many on concepts and topics new to the existing system. The resulting legislative
frenzy produced many unclear and inconsistent laws which compounded the difficulties
facing judges in deciding cases under this new framework.. To address this problem, the
process of legislative drafting should be improved to produce clearer and consistent laws,
amenable to easier interpretation and application.
1. Current Problems
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The quality of legislative drafting is described by government agencies, judges and lawyers
alike as inconsistent at best. The current laws and procedures regulating legislative drafting
are described in Annex V.
Perceived problems in Legislative Drafting
There is evidence to suggest that there is a tendency first to over-legislate, and also to place
detailed implementation issues into the text of a law rather than use subordinate legislation.
This results in part from the lack of direct definition as to what should be regulated by
primary legislation and what by secondary legislation.
There is no formal procedure for comparing the policy objectives, as initially approved, and
the final draft to determine if both are consistent. If additional policy issues come up during
the drafting process, the drafters thenmselves are often left on their own to make judgments
on policy issues.
Typically much of Bulgarian legislation is drafted using foreign models. The Ministry of
Justice considers that using mixed teams of local and foreign experts to be the optimal mode
of cooperation where foreign assistance has been found to be necessary.
The Government has no formal right to comment on legislation introduced by members of
Parliament, although in practice it is often shared with the Council of Ministers before being
formally offered in Parliament.
Those parties who would be involved in implementing a new draft law are frequently not
invited to participate in the drafting process, which can lead to implementation difficulties.
No procedures exist for participation by NGOs in the legislative process. It is difficult for
interested groups to obtain copies of draft laws without appropriate connections and to
participate in the debate process. Public trust could be increased by making the process more
transparent.
2. European Union Assistance in the area of Legislative Drafting
The European Union is providing assistance, through the MOJ, in assuring the conformity of
new laws with the acquis communautaire. Beyond EU conformity, the EU, through its Phare
program has provided some training in legislative drafting to line ministries but continues to
find difficulties in the drafting capacity and in management of the drafting process. The EU
had attempted to develop a manual of legislative drafting procedures for which EU would
have provided financial assistance. The Government instead opted to amend the Law on
Normative Acts. A review of this amendment to the law will further determine the nature of
the Bank’s recommendations in this area.
 
3. Possible interventions
Based on an analysis of the revised Law on Normative Acts, the Bank and the EU should
consider whether the changes envisaged would improve the quality and process of legislative
drafting. Following this review and, in coordination with the EU, potential interventions in




establishing a clear process for deciding whether and what type of legislative action is
necessary to give effect to given a objective,
providing training to law drafters in key ministries and Parliament, including consideration of
the budgetary consequences of legislative enforcement,
strengthening the capacity of MOJ to coordinate the process of legislative drafting, provide
the conformity checks with respect to Bulgarian and EU legislation and to look at issues of
implementation,
strengthening the process of including affected government bodies in work groups,
making the drafting process more transparent, so that there are opportunities for the public to
comment on draft legislation and supplementary regulations.
 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL JUDGMENTS
The efficient and reliable enforcement of contracts and property claims is a fundamental
element of a functioning market economy. Similar to most of the other European transition
economies, enforcement of judgments in civil cases is widely recognized as being highly
ineffective in Bulgaria. This impression is shared both within the judiciary, the MOJ and
business community alike with adjectives such as "disastrous" being attributed to the
enforcement process. In the opinion of one member of the business community, "the real
problems with the courts start when you actually get your judgment".
Bailiffs in the Bulgarian system ("execution judges") are trained as judges and form part of
the judiciary. Execution procedures are slow and some measure of change to these procedures
is expected in proposed changes to the Civil Procedure Law which may assist in improving
the speed of execution of judgements.
Annex VII shows the statistics maintained by the MOJ for execution cases in 1997. This gives
some idea of the extent of the problem - of a total number of 531,169 execution cases
pending before the Regional courts in 1997, only 92,096 were enforced.
 
A. Current Enforcement Procedures
Once a party has obtained an order for judgment before the Courts, an application to the office
of the execution judge is made. The execution judge then serves a summons for voluntary
execution giving the losing party seven days to pay the judgement order. At this time, bank
accounts of the debtor are frozen, a notice is placed at the entry office for land, and the tax
administration office is contacted for information on the location of real property. If taxes are
unpaid the IRS also becomes a party to the proceedings at this stage. After the expiry of the
seven day period the judge can commence action for involuntary execution and can proceed
against the debtor’s assets.
One estimate by an execution judge interviewed, put the average time to execute a judgment,
which isn’t appealed, at six months. The true average execution time was estimated to be
much longer, as an order by the execution judge can be appealed before the originating court
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and the appeals process through the courts can then be exhausted. If an execution order is not
appealed within the appropriate time period, the execution judge can proceed to sell the assets
of the debtor by auction. The auction process is public, carried out by the judge, extremely
involved and time consuming. The execution judges also complain of a lack of space for
carrying out these auctions.
B. Perceived Problems
Many of the problems identified with the enforcement of judgements echo the general
problems in the court system outlined in Section III. A above, such as procedural problems
related to summonses, working conditions, poor salary, and lack of training for execution
judges. Some of the deficiencies in the system include those set out below:
 
Problems Identified in Civil Enforcement
Problems with serving of summonses - The USAID report identifies problems with respect
to serving summonses on defendants and witnesses as key reasons for delays in proceedings –
at the enforcement stage delays also result when the execution judge is unable to serve the
summons on a debtor. The repeated need for a fresh summons at each stage slows down the
process. Reform is needed so that if a debtor gets one notice, a creditor can proceed to
judgment.
Lack of computer links between the courts – There are no computer links between courts
(including the entry offices for land registration), the police, and tax offices. This makes the
task of enforcement of judgments extremely burdensome and slows down the procedure.
Auctions are held by execution judges - The auction is conducted by the execution judge
and is exceedingly time consuming. In looking at the judicial branch, the question should be
asked whether there is a need for a judge to perform the role of auctioneer. Constraints of
available space and resources would also support a move to subcontract this function to
private agencies.
Inadequate means - Judges are given inadequate means, e.g. transportation, buildings,
protection, to effectively discharge their duties. The need for some sort of assistance for
execution judges, whether from MOI police or a suggested new special judicial police, in
enforcing judgments was identified.
Lack of training - Execution judges were identified as frequently being the worst educated of
the judges –no specific training is currently provided to the execution judges.
Leftover protectionism- The Civil Procedure Code still contains elements of leftover debtor
protectionism of the socialist system. This needs to be amended to make the enforcement
mechanism more creditor-friendly.
Finding assets - The inability of the courts to locate the assets of the debtor because of the
hiding of assets /fraudulent conveyance of assets.
Asset valuations - Execution also requires substantial and complicated asset valuations and
sales procedures tied to those estimates. For example, the execution sale price of movables
must be at least 100% of the assessed value of the property, which is highly unrealistic for an
execution sale. Real property sales must be at 80% of the assessed value.
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In some countries, the enforcement function of the courts has, to a greater or lesser extent,
been privatized. An interesting and positive development has taken place recently in Georgia.
The newly privatized notary service has been used by several private parties in lieu of court
executors to enforce monetary claims. Under the law, in non-contested cases (where the
debtor does not argue the merits of the case and admits his/her debt in full), a private notary
can enforce a claim. In a reported case of a mortgage foreclosure where the debtor did not
contest the claim, the entire transaction took place through a notary who received a percentage
(two percent) of the claim. With the recent privatization of the notarial function in Bulgaria,
this type of solution may be workable in Bulgaria too.
 
Suggested Measures
The legal basis for the functioning of the execution judges lies in the Civil Procedure Code.
Revisions to this code are currently being prepared with a view to submission to Parliament in
1999. The proposed revisions to this law should be reviewed to determine if problems
identified in this area have been or will be effectively tackled through this amendment. Other
laws may also require some revision in order to speed up enforcement and to prevent
fraudulent measures intended to thwart judicial orders (e.g. provisions on fraudulent
conveyance). Any changes would go beyond imposing tighter deadlines (as proposed in a
current draft revision) which are often overlooked by the courts and the parties and could
include developing summary case disposition mechanisms or fostering ADR options.
Undertake a study on the privatization of the bailiff function, including the use of private
auctioneers. Execution sales could be conducted by a trustee / auctioneer, who is not a
salaried court employee, but rather, a private person paid a commission based on the sale
price obtained. This would place the execution sale process in the hands of a professional and
provide substantial incentive to obtain a high price for the property.
To the extent the bailiff function is not privatized, or the enforcement of certain judgments is
left to the execution judges, a training plan should be devised to establish a professional cadre
of court executors (whether judges or not) and provide them sufficient resources, including
means of transportation, information services, and protection, to discharge their duties
efficiently.
 
V. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE
JUDICIARY
A. Access to Justice
It appears that elements of the Bulgarian public are aware of their legal rights and that the
court system is used by some in order to settle disputes. The public use of the court system
has undoubtedly been assisted by a fairly active press which assists in increasing awareness of
any legislative changes by publishing its understanding of the provisions and intent of laws
and legislation.
The level of court fees does not appear to deter the public from using the courts. In civil cases
where a monetary amount is specified, the court fee is 4% of the amount in dispute and must
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be paid up front. In all cases, court fees are set by the Law on Local Taxes and Fees under
which a common tariff is published intermittently. Tariffs are approved by a decree of the
Council of Ministers (usually instigated by MOJ which consults SJC and MOF). It has been a
stated priority of the Government to make fees accessible to the public. Court fees are
collected by the courts and paid to the central government budget.
In civil cases, individuals appear to be using the court system with or without legal
representation. A regional judge in a provincial town estimated that only in 20% to 50% of the
civil cases before the court were the parties represented by lawyers. At the district level, this
percentage was stated to be closer to 90%. The level of legal fees varies greatly in Bulgaria,
but remains, in large measure, accessible.
The state provides a legal aid system under the Criminal Procedure Code for individuals
charged with certain, more serious, crimes. This is provisioned in, and funded out of, the
budget of each court. A list of local lawyers is maintained by the courts and their fees are then
paid directly by the court. The Open Society has recently provided assistance in printing
wallet sized cards summarizing rights for defendants upon arrest and has distributed these at
police stations as well as publishing more specific brochures on legal rights of defendants for
police officers.
No legal aid is provided in civil cases. The Civil Procedure Code does provide that the
successful party in any case can be awarded an amount for costs incurred and nothing
prohibits lawyers from accepting cases on a contingency basis. This happens little in practice.
The development of small claims courts (without legal representation) could assist in
alleviating the additional burden of unrepresented parties on the court system.
The European Union has identified the strengthening of the legal aid system as an area for




The level of use of Bulgarian courts in civil matters (excluding family law cases) should be
confirmed by conducting an analysis of the current civil case load of first instance courts,
comparing it to Bulgarian statistics for early 90s/late 80s and to analogous figures of a
Western civil law country with comparative population. The study should also compare the
level of court fees relative to average income to insure their appropriateness.
A study be undertaken on the number of cases which are tried with legal representation and
the effect of legal representation on the outcome of the case in order to ascertain if the lack of
legal aid in civil and some criminal cases prejudices the right to a fair trial before the courts.
A study be undertaken on the comparative level and accessibility of current legal fees charged
by lawyers in private practice.
In order to confirm the anecdotal evidence on the level of public awareness of legal rights,
survey work be conducted, and if awareness needs to be increased, specific public awareness
campaigns could be conducted with a view to informing the public of their legal rights.
B. Public Perception of the Judiciary; Issues of Corruption
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Very little respect for the law and legal institutions exists in Bulgaria, and even less respect is
accorded the individual judges, prosecutors, investigators, and police. As the NGO Coalition
2000 stated in its Anti-Corruption Action Plan, "[the judicial system] receives a low measure
of trust both from the public at large and from other state institutions. It is popularly believed
to be slow, inefficient, and corrupt." If the private sector does not trust the state to enforce
rules governing business activities, investment will suffer.
To address all of the causes of poor public perception, expected legislative reforms must be
passed, and more importantly, implemented fairly and transparently. The Government
program currently includes civil service reforms, public procurement reforms, transparency
and access to non-sensitive government information, protection for whistle blowers, and
extensive substantive reforms in the civil and criminal law and procedures. These reforms
should establish and standardize the manner in which cases are handled, so that the outcome
of any case would depend on the applicable substantive law, as opposed to an untrained or
corrupt magistrate’s whims.
However, one of the other major complaints by the public is that the judicial system is too
slow, particularly in criminal cases. This cannot just be addressed by reforms of the civil and
criminal procedure codes, although that will be an important step. As recommended above,
the judicial branch must also computerize and systematize record keeping, case management,
and statistical data, in order to be able to pinpoint problems resulting in delays. It must put in
place an administrative control structure through which these issues are regularly addressed.
Proper training for all components of the justice system will also result in fewer mistakes and
more streamlined application of existing procedures. Higher pay would attract and retain a
better class of judicial employee.
Disciplinary issues and criminal immunity problems must be addressed in order to reach the
issue at the heart of the public perception problems. It is imperative that the SJC establish a
series of standards of conduct for judicial branch employees, and establish a formal
disciplinary system to enforce these standards regularly, equally, and fairly.
Perception problems with the judiciary cannot be addressed without also focusing on issues of
criminal enforcement. One of the biggest perception problems in Bulgaria is the belief that
high officials can get away with just about any criminal act, and particularly with corruption.
Nearly any Bulgarian can recite examples of this truism, involving people with whom they are
acquainted. This entrenched belief is perhaps strongest regarding the police and the members
of the judiciary.
There are two issues which must be addressed in order to deal with this problem. First, the
judicial branch must establish an internal affairs mechanism, so that routine criminal
corruption investigations are carried out. All such cases would have to go directly to the
Supreme Judicial Council, due to the second issue. Currently, the Constitution provides
criminal immunity to all judicial branch professionals, and the only way to have this
immunity lifted is to make a request to the Supreme Judicial Council. No plans exist to amend
the Constitution, or the related implementing laws which additionally provide criminal
immunity to these employees. Since requests to relieve an individual of immunity are almost
never made to the SJC, this criminal immunity is virtually absolute, and the public perception
of extensive and free corruption is well-founded.
Under existing circumstances, the only possible way to deal with this state of affairs is to
create a strong and public factual basis for the lifting of immunity. This will only happen if
internal affairs investigations are conducted and the criminal conduct directly exposed to the
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SJC, and then widely exposed to the media. Public pressure would undoubtedly eventually
grow for the removal of immunity and in favor of the criminal prosecution of a corrupt
official, if a proper and complete factual basis is provided. We note, however, that the
Bulgarian view of this second option is quite cynical.
The Coalition 2000 anti-corruption plan recommends the creation of an independent body
which would investigate government corruption; this suggestion has been strongly support by
foreign advisors, such as the US Treasury law enforcement team. An independent inspector
general-type system would also work in this context, if it had the access to internal court
workings in the manner of an internal affairs office within the judicial branch. The style and
location of this function is a decision for the government of Bulgaria; however it decides to
bring law enforcement and criminal law to apply to all citizens, including judicial branch
employees, this action will directly address the most serious problem of the public perception
of the current system of justice.
The National Assembly is currently considering legislation which would require public
financial disclosure by high-level government officials. This requirement of financial
disclosure is part of the national strategy to combat crime and corruption. The Bank would
recommend that the draft law be amended to require disclosure by all professional members
of the judicial branch. The review of such disclosure forms should be made on an annual basis
by the requested disciplinary arm of the SJC. Any discrepancies and any potential conflicts of
interest should be explained by the individual judicial branch member. If the form discloses
evidence of criminal conduct, the matter would then be referred to the internal affairs criminal
investigative structure. The refusal to cooperate with this requirement should be grounds for
sanction under the disciplinary arm of the SJC; a final refusal to provide information should
be grounds for dismissal. The law on financial disclosure would have to be carefully crafted
to ensure that it coordinates with the applicable Constitutional requirements. Of course, if it is
determined that criminal conduct has occurred, then the matter would be referred to the SJC
with a request for the lifting of criminal immunity.
VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The present Government has taken significant steps to start the reform of its public
administration, including the judicial branch. In the area of legal and judicial reform,
important changes have been or will soon be implemented. A summary of the initiatives
undertaken to date by the Government in this area, and a description of reforms in the
pipeline, are set out in Annex V to this report.
As illustrated in this report, much still remains to be done. The judicial branch has no
centralized management staff for budgetary and administrative planning, no effective
disciplinary organization, no facilities or other arrangements for training new personnel or for
continuing education of existing personnel, no centralized or uniform case management
criteria or system, very poor enforcement of judgements, poor physical court facilities in the
busiest courts, and very poor administrative and clerical assistance for judicial professionals.
There is clear commitment on the part of the Government to fight corruption and, as part of
this effort, to tackle some related issues in the functioning of the judicial system. Many of the
reforms described in Annex V are extremely necessary and timely. In contrast to the
Government’s planned reform of its public administration, the measures taken to date in the
area of judicial reform do not appear to form part of an overarching, integrated judicial reform
strategy but rather, represent a sequence of reactive measures designed in large part to combat
corruption and overcome perceived inefficiencies in the system.
32
In order to bring about systemic change in the judicial system as a whole, a strategic vision
for the judicial branch needs to be developed and a holistic reform program designed and
implemented. Assuming any such national program to be sound, its adoption would most
certainly act as a catalyst in attracting foreign financing for judicial reform activities.
The most critical reforms and measures suggested in the body of this report are summarized
below. All the suggestions made by the Bank in this report are intended to assist the
Government in forming a clear picture of the breadth of the reforms necessary in designing a
program to bring about systemic change in the judicial system. On the basis of these
recommendations, the Government should continue its efforts to develop the direction and
design of its own reform program and take the first, and most fundamental step toward this
goal, the preparation of a phased reform program for the judicial system. An institutional
body should be charged with this task, a body or working group representing a cross section
of interests in the judicial system including the following: judicial branch professionals, SJC,
MOJ, legal NGOs, legal academics, MOI, Bulgarian Bar Association, MOE. This working
group would then also form a counterpart group to coordinate the activities of various donors
and international financial institutions in the area of legal and judicial reform.
 
 
A Proposed Reform Agenda
Strengthening the SJC
An important weakness identified in this report lies in the lack of institutional support for the
SJC in fulfilling its constitutional mandate to oversee the judicial branch. As recommended in
this report, strengthening the SJC represents an essential prerequisite for any reform program
in order to allow it properly to perform its constitutional role. Support is necessary to build its
budgetary, supervisory and planning capacity, its methodology in personnel matters and its
capacity to assess the physical needs of the courts. To implement the Government’s anti-
corruption strategy, an internal affairs function within SJC should be developed to handle
internal corruption investigations on an on-going basis for all parts of the judiciary.
Fundamental Public Administration Issues
Other broader issues, critical to a judicial reform strategy, should be looked at by GOB. These
include: the extent of the immunities given to the judiciary; determination of a satisfactory
pay scale for judges; and achieving greater coordination between the functions and resources
of the SJC and the MOJ and devising means so that these two bodies could work together to
assist each in performing their respective roles.
Tackling the Inefficiencies in the Court System
Both this report and the USAID report make a number of recommendations for the
improvement of caseload management in the courts. The GOB is urged to build upon existing
efforts to create the Uniform Information System, initially for the criminal caseload, and later
for the civil caseload. A computerized case-tracking, file management, and docketing system
should be developed for the courts to enable them to capture complete information on length
of cases and manner of disposition at each stage of a case.
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Before seeking donor assistance, an internal review of each part of the judicial branch should
be undertaken to determine the computer assets owned in the courts and to evaluate the
software systems available. This review should be combined with an analysis of any physical
space available and modifications required to the court buildings in order to provide for
increased computerization. The clerical needs of the courts also need to be examined in the
light of the USAID report and the advent of increased computerization.
Functions of, and Alternatives to, the Court System
Other components of an overall judicial strengthening program should also include measures
such as the development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the establishment
of "small claims" courts or procedures. It will also be necessary to take a long, hard look at
the functions performed by the courts, such as registration of land and enterprises, and to
determine if the courts are the proper place for these functions.
Improving the Quality of Legal Education and Legislative Drafting
Within the context of the Government’s reform program in the area of higher education, the
education and training needs of Bulgarian lawyers and judges need to be reassessed. Experts,
preferably from a civil law system within the EU, may be able to provide assistance in this
area. A similar assessment should also be carried out, in consultation with the EU, of the
process and quality of legislative drafting.
Focus on Enforcement
Greater emphasis should be placed on developing measures to improve the enforcement of
judgments. Any other measures to strengthen the judiciary would come to nothing if the
present weaknesses in enforcement remained an ongoing bottleneck in the administration of
justice.
Access to Justice
In view of the EU’s accession requirements, further analysis could usefully be undertaken of
any real or perceived obstacles to easy access to justice for all citizens.
Anti-Corruption Strategy
A functioning and independent judiciary is central to any anti-corruption strategy. The courts
cannot be effective in controlling corruption unless corruption is eradicated from within the
ranks of the judiciary. The proposals made in this report for strengthening the SJC,
establishing ethical norms, formalized disciplinary channels and an oversight function for the
judiciary would constitute the first steps in attempting to rid the judiciary of internal
corruption and equip it to be an effective tool in the Government’s overall anti-corruption
strategy. The Government is also urged to look at the issues raised in this report on the extent
of the criminal immunity granted to members of the judiciary.
Annex I
Structure of the Courts
The court system of Bulgaria is based on a tradition dating back to the end of Ottoman rule
over Bulgaria in 1878. At this time a court system was introduced that was based on Western
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European experience and, with some amendments, continued to exist until the end of the
Second World War. The existing system then was adapted to the Soviet model.
Under the 1991 constitution, as subsequently implemented by statute, Bulgaria has a three-
tiered court system, consisting of first instance, intermediate appellate, and supreme courts.
The current court system comprises not only the courts as such, but also prosecution and
investigation offices located at each court
1. The Supreme Judicial Council
The organs of the court system are under the supervision of the Supreme Judicial Council
(SJC), a body of 25 members, one half of which are elected by Parliament and the other half
by organs of the judicial power (5 by the judges, 3 by the prosecutors, and 3 by the
investigators). The presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court along with the Prosecutor General are members of the Supreme Judicial
Council ex officio. The Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the Minister of Justice, who
however, has no voting-right.
2. General Courts
There are two categories of courts: general and specialized courts. General courts are those
that hear cases of any origin (private, commercial, criminal, administrative).
(a) Regional Courts
Regional courts are trial courts of general jurisdiction for all cases in Bulgaria except for those
assigned by law to another court. By law a regional court must be established in any
community or region with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Presently there are 116 regional
courts in the country. After three years of service regional court judges are granted life tenure,
subject to removal by the SJC for statutorily-defined reasons. They must have at least two
years of legal or judicial experience. Civil cases are heard by one judge while in divorce,
criminal, and labor cases two judicial assessors participate with the judge in hearing the case.
Regional courts are managed by a president appointed by the SJC. The president, in addition
to maintaining the caseload, is responsible for the court’s organization and administrative
affairs and makes case assignments. Each regional court has its own executing judge (bailiff’s
office) prosecutor’s office and investigation services.
Attached to the Regional Courts is the land registry.
(b) District Courts
District courts hear appeals from regional court decisions. They also have original jurisdiction
in civil cases where the award sought exceeds five million leva and in criminal matters where
the violations charged carry a sentence of more than 15 years. Currently, Bulgaria has twenty
eight district courts corresponding to the 28 administrative regions into which the country
used to be divided. In addition, there is Sofia City Court which to all intents and purposes
functions as a district court.
District courts may be divided into departments depending on the caseload and the number of
judges assigned to the court (e.g. civil, criminal, commercial, administrative and family law).
Most cases are heard by a panel of three judges, one of whom may be a junior judge. A junior
judge is usually a new judge who has graduated from law school and successfully completed
his apprenticeship year. Junior judges are appointed to serve two year terms, but are eligible
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to become regional court judges after one year of service. Panels are chaired by the most
senior judge. Capital cases, and some other complex cases, may be tried by a panel of three
judges and four assessors.
District court judges other than junior judges are appointed for life by the SJC, with limited
removal ability, and must have at least five years of legal or judicial experience. The SJC
appoints presidents of the district courts who have responsibilities similar to regional court
presidents. They also assign judges to judicial departments. As with regional courts, each
district court has a related prosecutor’s office and investigation service.
Attached to the District Courts is the company register. The District Court of Sofia (called
"City Court") has along with all the tasks attributed to a District Court the following
functions:
- Registration of all political parties in Bulgaria;
- Accreditation of foreign judgements to be executed in Bulgaria;
- Appeal against arbitration decisions;
- Issuing of execution orders for arbitration decisions.
(c ) Courts of Appeal
This level of court became operational early in 1998. The courts of appeal hear appeals, in
three judge panels, from district courts within their jurisdictional territory. There are five
courts of appeal in the country and one military court of appeal. The non-military courts are
located in Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna and Veliko Tornovo, the Military Court of Appeal is
located in Sofia. As a rule they are second instance courts and review appeals on first instance
decisions of the District Courts on civil, commercial and criminal issues. As a second instance
court, the Court of Appeal hears the case de novo.
As a first instance court it hears cases on disciplinary measures against junior judges and
junior prosecutors. There are three sections within the Court of Appeal: civil, commercial and
criminal. The panels are staffed by three judges unless the law provides otherwise.
Judges for the courts of appeal have been appointed by the SJC, and must have at least ten
years of legal/judicial experience. Appointments are for life, subject to removal for
statutorily-defined reasons. The courts are divided into civil, commercial and criminal
departments, and are presided over by a court president appointed by the SJC. Each court has
its own appellate prosecutor’s office.
 
(d) The Supreme Court of Cassation
The Supreme Court of Cassation, located in Sofia, is the highest instance of the general court
system. The 1991 Constitution reinstated Bulgaria’s old Supreme Court with two new courts:
the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court. The Cassation Court
is the highest appellate court for civil and criminal cases and under the Constitution "shall
exercise supreme judicial oversight as to the precise and equal application of the law by all
courts." Its decisions are binding on all judicial and executive authorities.
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The Cassation Court is organized into civil, criminal and military departments. Together, all
judges of the Cassation court form the plenum, which determines the membership of the
departments, and sits on disciplinary actions. In hearing appeals of individual cases the court
sits on panels of three judges.
The SJC appoints Cassation Court judges for life, subject to removal for statutorily-defined
reasons, and they must have at least 14 years of experience in the law or judiciary (Under
pending legislation this may be reduced to 12 years.). A court president is also appointed by
the SJC and serves a non-renewable seven year term. The President of Bulgaria may veto the
SJC’s choice for president once, but if the name is resubmitted (following a simple majority
vote) he cannot veto it. The court president presides over the plenum and performs
administrative functions similar to those of lower court presidents.
Disciplinary cases against judges, prosecutors and investigators, are heard by it as a court of
first instance. The Supreme Court of Cassation is also to hear appeals against decisions of the
disciplinary court of advocates, if the advocate has been indefinitely suspended from
practicing law.
3. Specialized Courts
Specialized Courts in Bulgaria are the Supreme Administrative Court and the Military Courts.
(a) The Supreme Administrative Court
The Supreme Administrative Court is located in Sofia. The Supreme Administrative Court is
the appellate court of highest instance for cases involving the legality of administrative acts
and regulations, and hears appeals of that nature from the lower courts. In addition, this court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of acts of the Council of
Ministers and other ministers.
The court sits in three-judge panels when it hears administrative challenges from individual
litigants complaining of government actions that directly affect them. In these cases the court
hears appeals as a cassation instance, from either the regional or district courts following first-
instance decisions. In cases involving challenges to normative acts, the court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction, and sits in five-judge panels. It sits in general assembly (en banc) when
passing interpretative rulings, when resolving incorrect or contradictory judicial practice, and
when referral to the Constitutional Court is at issue.
Judges for this court are appointed under the same conditions as Cassation Court judges: they
are appointed for life and are subject to removal only for statutorily-defined reasons. The
same holds true for the president of this court who serves a non-renewable seven-year term.
(b) The Military Courts
The Military Courts are attached to the general courts. However, the first instance of the
Military Courts is not the Regional, but the District Court. Rulings of the Military District
Court may be appealed to the Military Court of Appeal, and the decision of the latter are
subject to appeal before the Military Section of the Supreme Court of Cassation. The Military
Courts are mainly designed to try crimes committed by military staff or by civilians that are
hired by the armed forces. A minor part of the jurisdiction of the Military Courts relates to
civil cases brought in connection with the armed forces. There are rumors that the military
courts will be abolished in the near future.
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(c) The Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court was established in 1991 and is located in Sofia. This court does not
form part of the court system and it’s budget is separate from the budget of the judiciary (not
received through the SJC). Cases may only be brought before the Constitutional Court by:
- 1/5 of the members of Parliament (currently 48)
- The President of the Republic
- The Council of Ministers
- The Supreme Court of Cassation
- The Supreme Administrative Court
It sits in one panel of 12 judges. Four are elected by the Parliament, four appointed by the
President, and four elected by the General Assembly of the Supreme Court of Cassation and
by the General Assembly of the Supreme Court of Cassation. The judges are appointed for a
term of nine years.
4. Prosecutors and Investigators
In Bulgaria, the prosecutorial and magistrate/investigative functions are constitutionally
placed in the Judicial Branch. The placement of the prosecutorial function there is not
historical; it was a response to the misuse of that power for political reasons during the Soviet
regime. The Constitution makes very clear that the judicial power is to be independent of the
other branches of government, and all members of this branch enjoy special civil and criminal
immunities and tenures.
The structure of the prosecutor’s offices is mandated to parallel that of the court systems. The
Chief Prosecutor is charged to enforce the criminal law by bringing criminal charges, by
overseeing enforcement of punishments, by moving to rescind all illegal acts of the
government, and to take part in civil and administrative suits where legally appropriate. In
coordination with the structure of the court system, the Chief Prosecutor is headquartered in
Sofia, and is responsible for the various regional prosecutor’s offices throughout the country.
The new Judicial Powers Act is expected to change the authority of the Chief Prosecutor by
dividing it. This change is in response to the widespread feeling by both the government and
the public that the prosecutor’s offices have not always acted to carry out their legal
responsibilities, and that they have sometimes been the source of extreme delays and
corruption.
The investigative function will also be affected by the Judicial Powers Act. Until now, it has
been known as the National Investigative Service (NIS). The NIS has had the constitutional
responsibility to perform all preliminary investigations in criminal cases. The preliminary
investigation consists of both additional field investigation and the formalization of evidence
for later presentation in court. However, again due to concerns about long delays and
allegations of corruption, the NIS will now change to the Federal Investigation Bureau, which
will concentrate on more serious national crime. The preliminary investigative function in







Under the current system the registers maintained at the courts rovide official information on
immovable property. At each Regional Court (112 in total) there is a land registration agency.
Until recently land registration was part of the notary agency at the Regional Courts. As
notaries have been private since September 1998, the newly private notaries no longer belong
to the court system. Registration of rights over immovable property that used to be one of the
tasks of the former notaries public, is now performed by the land registration agencies at the
Regional Courts. Private notaries now assist their clients in the preparation, drafting and
recording of transactions involving immovable property which the notaries then present to the
registration agencies in the courts for registration.
The land register is arranged alphabetically according to the name of the owner of a plot of
land (the "personal system" rather than the parcel-based system). In order to identify the
owner of a certain piece of land, there is no other way than going through all the personal files
to find the plot of land. This makes information very clumsy and uncertain. This deficiency of
the current system was one of the major reasons behind a complete reform of the land
registration system that is now underway and will start with a new land registration law to be
presented to Parliament next year. One of the key elements of this law will be the transition to
the so-called "parcel based system". Arrangement of the register will then be made according
to the registered plot of land. Title searches will then be much easier and certain for the
purchaser of a right on immovable property.
The current registration system is maintained on paper. There is, however, a computerized
information system called NOTIS that follows the traditional "personal system", but enables
the user to identify easily the owner of a certain piece of land. This system has been worked
out under the sponsorship of the PHARE program since 1995. It was installed first at the
Regional Court of the city of Pazardjik in 1996 and is now available at 7 of the 112 Regional
Courts of Bulgaria. Further extension up to 22 Regional Courts is projected.
After transition to the "parcel based system" the NOTIS program will be changed into a new
program to be called TIRES. The transition to TIRES is said to be easy from a technical point
of view.
Private notaries still are not using the NOTIS system, since a network between the registration
agencies and private notaries has not yet been created. As this network is deemed to be highly
desirable, private firms will be engaged by PHARE to work on it from the end of 1998 on.
The creation of computer links between registration agencies and private notaries will not be a
difficult technical problem, as long as the network will operate on a local basis, since the
connection will be made by telephone links. Local telephone connections in Bulgaria are
fairly good, while long distance telephone communication, needed for a nation-wide
information network, still is in in bad shape. The fees to be incurred by private notaries for
local networks would be reasonable, whereas a national information system would be much
more expensive.
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The transition to the private notaries system has caused a significant relief for the Regional
Courts. As an example, the staff of the land registration agency al the Regional Court of Sofia
has been reduced from 20 to 10 after privatization of the notaries. This is due to the fact that
an important part of the activities carried out und the former system at the notaries public
section of the Regional Courts, e.g. documentary proof, is now being done by the private
notaries. On the other hand, the fees to be paid by citizens for transactions of immovable
property, due to a restrictive fee-policy of the Government, are less than they were under the
former system. The fees charged by the private notaries are fixed by law and are quite
moderate, maybe even too moderate to make the profession as a private notary attractive.
Privatization of notaries has another side-effect that is worth mentioning: All the former
notaries public have left the registration agencies under the new law, most of them have
become private notaries. The Ministry of Justice was forced to recruit a completely new staff
at the land registration agencies. As a consequence, the personnel of these agencies is not
sufficiently trained. Training should be a high priority in order to ensure a functioning land
registration system.
2. Register of Collateral
In November 1996 a Law on Collateral was passed by Parliament creating a Central Register
of Collateral. This register is under the control of the Ministry of Justice and is located in
Sofia. The office is staffed by about 15 people. Claims, movables, shares, bonds etc. cannot
be given as security unless physical possession is given to the creditor or the security interest
is registered in the Central Register of Collateral. The registration system is fully
computerized. Since registration fees are moderate and the procedures relatively simple, the
system has become popular in a short time and can support itself out of the fees levied.
 
3. Company Register
Company registers are established at all of the 28 District Courts. The composition of
registration staff in each court differs according to its work load. For example, the City Court
of Sofia has 12 register-judges and 15 office staff, while the District Court of Sofia,
competent for the district around Sofia excluding the city area, has only 3 registration-judges
with 4 office staff. Most of the registration-judges are engaged in other activities, e.g.
bankruptcy procedures, but in general, more than one half of their working time is devoted to
registration issues.
The register is kept on paper, but there is a computer system called DELPHI that provides the
same information as the official register on paper and is updated to the latest status of
registration. There are efforts underway to create a centralized electronic company register for
the whole country, which is needed for easy access to data mainly on bankruptcy of
companies, but it is still not operative.
The procedure of registration takes about one week if the correct application documentation is
submitted to the register. In big cities, however, the procedure may take significantly longer,
due to the work load of the courts. Recently the increase of the common stock capital required
for companies has caused delays.








Under Section 87 of the Constitution of Bulgaria, the right of legislative initiative belongs to:
- each member of Parliament; and
- the Council of Ministers.
The Law on Normative Acts was enacted in 1973 and has not been explicitly amended since.
Much of this law is now considered void as many provisions contravene the provisions of the
1991 Constitution. A draft amendment to the Law on Normative Acts is under preparation
and, at the time of writing, about to be released for comment. The stated purpose of the
amendment will try to clarify the procedures for legislative drafting and introduce mandatory
conformity checks. Also regulating this area are the Rules on the Organization and Structure
of the National Assembly (the National Assembly Rules).
The drafting process for laws and subordinate legislation is defined in the Constitution, the
National Assembly Rules and the Law on Normative Acts. Bills submitted by members of
Parliament are drafted either by the respective member or by outside experts. All other
instruments are drafted by Government officials, usually from sectoral ministries or, if the
COM establishes an interagency group, by working groups established for the purpose.
If the Council of Ministers initiates a law, the draft law is usually prepared in the relevant line
ministry. All the draft laws written by ministries are (in theory) submitted to the Ministry of
Justice for review. The Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice (a permanent body of
about 21 lawyers) checks whether the draft law complies with Bulgarian and EU legislation,
essentially a conformity review, and points out inconsistencies and other deficiencies in the
draft. Due to resource constraints, the MOJ does not have the staff to perform the EU
conformity checks. The draft is usually submitted for comment to related ministries, state
agencies and labor unions. After having taken into consideration these comments, the draft is
signed by the Minister that had initiated it and submitted to the Council of Ministers for
approval. The legal department of the Council of Ministers then reviews the draft and adds
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recommendations and comments. After approval by the Council of Ministers the draft is
submitted to the Parliament. There it is reviewed by specialized committees before it is
submitted to the plenary session, which votes on the draft at first and second readings.
Under the current procedures, draft laws written by members of Parliament can be submitted
to the Parliament without being reviewed by any other body. In practice, however, members
of Parliament often apply to the Ministry of Justice or other ministries for comments on their
drafts. One of the weak points in the system is that the Government has no formal right to
comment on a draft initiated by a member of Parliament. The conformity checks conducted by
the Ministry of Justice do not occur, with the Parliament relying on its own Legislative
Council or staff lawyers. It is anticipated that the revised Law on Normative Acts will subject
all Bills to an MOJ conformity check but again, MOJ must be supplied with adequate
resources in order to perform this role..
After approval by the Parliament, the President of the Republic signs the law or puts a veto on
it. If the veto of the President is overruled by the Parliament in a second voting, the President
no longer has a right of veto and has to sign the law. The law becomes effective after
publication in the State Gazette.
Annex IV
Court Administration
Extract from USAID Report
1. Case Delays
There are many reasons for delays in the adjudication of cases and many changes that could
be pursued which would shorten the time for case disposition. The team does not profess to
have identified all of these areas. It is reporting some of the most common obstacles to the
more rapid disposition of cases and areas brought to its attention which could be explored and
addressed. ABA/CEELI has also been interested in the area of civil procedural code reform
and has many ideas on this subject. Attempts to effect change in most of these areas, however,
would require legislative changes. Some illustrative reasons for delay or areas in which
changes would shorten case disposition time include:
a. Administrative and clerical burdens of all judges
All judges spend substantial time on administrative duties thereby depriving them of time that
could be devoted to their cases. One judge estimated that two of five working days are spent
on administrative and clerical functions, examples of which include:
(1) Certification of all copies of judicial documents
(2) Signing and verifying certificates of good conduct
(These certificates are issued after searches are made of court conviction records. They are
required for many reasons such as getting licenses, for possible employment, etc.)
(3) Verifying/signing certificates of actual standing
(These certificates provide general data for businesses such as the name of the general
manager, real estate holdings, amount of capital, shareholders, etc. for interested parties.)
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(4) Issuing execution titles
(Judges who have issued case decisions issue orders to execution judges for enforcement of
such decisions. These execution titles duplicate the contents of the decision.)
 
(5) Verifying summonses
(Undeliverable summonses are returned to the judge to write a resolution to notify parties that
a new address for the person summoned is needed.)
(6) Certifying and signing summaries of proceedings (protocol) prepared by secretaries
(7) Procedurally reviewing claims for appeal
Since the judges do not have secretaries, they also type their own decisions (most on manual
typewriters), answer their own phones, and receive their own visitors. The enormous amount
of time spent in performing these administrative and clerical responsibilities takes valuable
time from their true function to hear and decide cases and contributes to delays in the
adjudication of cases. It also reinforces the relatively low esteem in which judges are held by
the public. Attempts to relieve judges of the duties enumerated in (1) - (7) above would most
likely require changes to Regulation #28 of the Ministry of Justice and, quite possibly, the
Procedural Codes and the Commercial Act.
b. Administrative Burdens of Chairmen
Chairmen (who are comparable to Chief Judges in the US) spend considerable amounts of
time on administrative functions. One Chairmen, who jokingly mentioned that he even hires
the cleaning ladies and arranges for snow removal at the court, estimated that 1/3 of his time
was spent on administrative functions of this kind, some examples of which include:
Personnel functions





These responsibilities take valuable time from the Chairmen who are often the most senior
judges in the court - time which could otherwise be devoted to hearing and deciding cases.
Any efforts to relieve Chairmen of these functions would most likely necessitate a change in
the Administrative Regulations of the MOJ. It may also necessitate change in the Judicial
Powers Act.
c. Lack of legal research assistance/legal information data software
Many judges do not have assistance in terms of legal research (apprentices) or sufficient legal
resources to aid them in their decision-making. While they are provided with the monthly
Bulletin from the MOJ which contains decisions considered to have established precedent,
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laws are changing rapidly and it is difficult to keep up with them. Some judges who have
computers have purchased legal information data software which contains such information as
updated legislation, normative acts (government decisions and regulations/subsidiary
legislation), Supreme Court decisions which represent precedent, and digest/review of
important court decisions below the Supreme Court level. Many judges, however, do not have
computers or legal information data software.
d. Poor performance by court staff
Court staff are responsible for delays due to the fact that cases and papers are sometimes lost
or misplaced, notices and other papers are not sent out in a timely fashion, and summonses are
improperly served. In addition, several judges mentioned that they receive frequent
complaints dealing with the behavior of the staff.
In general, there are no qualification standards for the selection of court staff. They receive no
formal training programs either for orientation or continuing education. Therefore, each time
a new employee is hired, the court has to provide fairly extensive on-the-job training. There
are no procedural manuals to which to refer if there are questions regarding procedures.
The Civil Service Law which will professionalize all civil servants (including court staff) has
passed first reading and is expected to pass second reading by the end of the year, with
implementation expected in 1999. Training facilitates such professionalism and improves the
performance of the staff.
e. Lack of training of judges
Judges are faced with cases involving areas in which they have never been concerned such as
commercial and business law, patent and trademark law, environmental law, commerce and
trade law, bankruptcy law, real and intellectual property law, and human and civil rights law.
In addition, they are confronted with rapidly-changing legislation. An extreme example
involves the law on ownership and use of agricultural land which has been changed 17 times
in the last six and one-half years. Decisions in cases are delayed because judges are uncertain
about the subject area to which it pertains. Training is needed in such areas. The Judicial
Training section of the report deals with these training needs in depth.
f. Lack of work ethic among judges
Judges have 14 days to write their opinions in criminal cases and 30 days to write their
decisions/opinions in civil cases. However, these time frames are often not observed. In fact,
disciplinary action was recently taken against a judge who had not written a decision in two
years.
Currently, District Court Chairmen are monitoring the performance of all judges in his region
through periodic reports submitted to him, ledger books containing case progress kept at the
regional and district courts, personal contacts, and inspections of regional courts. However,
their judgments regarding a particular judge’s performance is subjective. No systematic
criteria is used. Chairmen are reluctant to report judges to the Supreme Judicial Council
(which is responsible for monitoring judicial performance and taking disciplinary measures as
appropriate) and use performance only in deciding who should be promoted. The Inspectorate
of the Ministry of Justice performs evaluations of the administrative functions of the judges;
however, it has a large number of vacancies and last year performed evaluations of only five
district courts and two regional courts.
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g. Inability to quickly access information in criminal and civil cases
Criminal judges mention this as the biggest cause of delays in criminal cases. Defendants
often do not appear at hearings. In order to find the defendant, the court must send inquiries
by mail to the Director of Internal Affairs to determine the registered address, to the Passport
and VISA office to determine if the person has left the country, and to the Ministry of Justice
to determine if the person is in prison. This process is slow. In fact, the team observed a
hearing in which a case had been delayed for many years for several reasons, one of which
was because the defendant could not be found because he was incarcerated. The retrieval of
information, however, could be instantaneous through an integrated computer system which
links all of these governmental entities. Similarly, the system would be useful in determining
the registered addresses of witnesses and other needed information from other sources
included in the integrated system.
The GOB is working to establish such a system for criminal cases. The Center for Information
and Technology for Crime Prevention has been working since July 1998 to develop software
programs which would provide full information and comprehensive monitoring of the
movement of each individual case, from the point of registration by the Ministry of Interior,
through the investigation service, prosecutor’s office and court, to serving the punishment by
the perpetrator, and his following resocialization.
Once the criminal software system is developed, the Center intends to work on software for
civil cases. An integrated system in which judges can quickly access information from
governmental records (such as land records, firm and vehicle registrations, etc.) which is
needed in a case will shorten the time required to dispose of cases.
h. Complicated summonsing process
Reportedly, this is the cause of most of the delays in case disposition. If a defendant cannot be
found in order to serve a summons, it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to try to locate him.
This involves applying to the Director of Internal Affairs for the registered address of the
defendant, providing the court with a number of different possible addresses, including a work
address, and the issuance of many summonses to the same person at various addresses. If a
person refuses to accept a summons, a witnessed statement must be provided to the court by
the summons clerk. If the person cannot be ultimately found, he is summoned through the
State Gazette 30 days before the hearing (if in Bulgaria) or 90 days (if thought out of
Bulgaria). There are many instances in which a party has reported to have hidden to avoid
being served. A decision on evidence solely presented by the plaintiff is made if the defendant
does not appear.
Needed are procedural changes to simplify the summonsing process. Possibilities include
consideration that the defendant has been served if notification is made to the person’s
registered address (as is done in commercial cases) or making parties responsible for the
serving of summonses (as is done in the US). The Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria
(Coalition 2000 report) includes a recommendation that the system of summonsing be
changed to preclude the possibility of intentional delays of court hearings.
i. Intentional delays by attorneys
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Attorneys often abuse procedural rights by intentionally delaying court hearings. For example,
they are frequently reported to feign sicknesses, scheduling conflicts, business trips, and
allege that important witnesses are not available in order to delay cases.
The civil procedural code calls for a fine of 1/3 of the initially-determined state fee on the
responsible PARTY (not attorney for the party) for such delays. There is no such fine in the
code of criminal procedure. While the Law on the Bar contains disciplinary measures for
attorney delays, the Superior Bar Council does not impose such measures because it says that
it does not have sufficient funding to conduct the necessary investigation. Lawyers are not
willing to pay dues to enforce laws that could affect them adversely, nor are they willing to do
pro bono work to sanction their own.
Needed are substantial sanctions that judges can impose on attorneys who abuse procedural
rights. Changes in the Law on the Bar and Penal and Civil Procedural Codes to provide for
such sanctions were recommended in the Coalition 2000 report. Attitudinal training for judges
may be necessary to insure the imposition of these sanctions once they are established.
j. Prolonged Period for Collection of Evidence
Neither the civil or criminal procedural code call for any exchange of information prior to the
first meeting. (In criminal cases, the preferability for this exchange relates to private criminal
complaints which are filed directly with the court) The civil code states that only by exception
will new evidence be accepted after the first hearing; the criminal code is silent on this issue.
In fact, a substantial part of the evidence is accepted after the first hearing.
Judges go to great lengths to collect all evidence, even when it is obvious that all such
evidence may not be necessary. This practice may be rooted in the old civil tradition in which
judges assisted the parties. Since they no longer do so, they give whatever time parties feel
they need to adequately defend their positions. The tendency to allow prolonged periods for
the collection of evidence in criminal cases, on the other hand, is related to the basic
principles of the penal procedures which refer to the obligation of the court to establish what
is the objective truth and to give all opportunities to the party to defend his position.
Sometimes judges prefer to give to the defendant the opportunity to collect all evidence,
irrespective of its relevance, in order to protect themselves against grounds for appeals that
relevant evidence was not collected.
Needed are changes to the civil and criminal procedural codes to require the exchange of
information prior to the first hearing and the establishment of reasonable deadlines for the
production of all evidence. Attitudinal training for judges is also necessary for enforcement of
any requirements related to deadlines.
k. Failure by witnesses to appear
Witnesses are summoned by the court or, sometimes in civil cases, parties or lawyers take
responsibility for bringing them to the hearing. Witnesses frequently do not appear because
they are negligent or, in cases of material interest, are afraid (no witness protection plan), or
because their absence from work presents problems with their employer. In criminal cases, the
police can be used to bring witnesses to court. The fine for failure to appear is 3,000 leva (less
than $2.00 US) in civil cases but up to 100,000 leva(less than $63 US) in criminal cases.
However, judges are hesitant to impose such fines.
Many witnesses prefer to pay the minimal fine in civil cases instead of showing up.
Consequently, a higher fine in civil cases, requiring a change to the civil procedural code, is
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needed to preclude the failure of witnesses to appear. Attitudinal changes by judges are
necessary to insure that fines are indeed imposed. Such adjustments may be accomplished
through training.
l. Failure by judicial experts to appear
Judicial experts are appointed by the court from a list of such experts. In civil cases, they are
paid for by the parties through the court; in criminal cases, they are paid for by the State. The
amount of the expert’s fee is dependent on the type of case.
Judicial experts frequently do not appear at scheduled hearings in civil cases because they are
too busy and have scheduling conflicts. This does not appear to be a problem in criminal cases
because experts are more diligent to appear in these cases if necessary and often it is not
obligatory for them to do so since the written report was given and already clarified in the
preliminary investigation. Experts in criminal cases need not appear unless there is a need to
question them. The fine for failure to appear is 3,000 leva in civil cases and up to 200,000
leva in criminal cases. However, judges often do not impose such fines.
Parties have the right to request additional experts when they are dissatisfied with the
conclusions of an appointed expert. Three, five, or seven experts can be appointed by the
court under these circumstances. There can be substantial delays associated with the
appointment and coordination of these additional experts.
Needed are changes to the civil procedure code to insure attendance of judicial experts in civil
cases. These could include higher fines (and the imposition of these fines by judges), removal
of experts from the court’s list for failure to appear, or allowing parties to produce their own
experts. Privatizing experts would also reduce the number of hearings (and therefore delays)
because attorneys are dissatisfied with the conclusions of experts appointed by the court.
m. Workload associated with firm registrations
All firm registrations - even sole proprietorships - and changes thereof are filed in the district
court. There were 77,000 such registrations in 1997. Judges must review all business
documents in order to approve registration. This is a purely administrative task that could be
performed by an administrative arm of the court or possibly be transferred outside of the
court. It is performed by independent State agencies in the US and by chambers of commerce
in many countries in Europe. To effect such changes would most likely require amendments
to the Commercial Act and the Regulations on Registers.
n. Workload associated with appeals
Approximately 50% of all cases are appealed. This has been attributed to the Bulgarian
tendency to be suspicious and distrustful of the judicial system and the fact that the fee to
appeal (2% of the material interest) is low. One ex-judge estimated that at least 20% of all
civil appeals are frivolous. Such a high rate of appeals creates a workload burden on the
courts since cases are heard more than once. A mechanism that would reasonably limit the
number of appeals and, consequently, reduce the workload of the courts is desirable.
In the second instance court, new evidence can be introduced in both civil and criminal cases.
This is often done in civil cases. The civil procedure code states that if one of the parties
causes delays through new claims showing new evidence which could have been shown
before, he is obligated to pay the expenses of the new court hearing (including the
proceedings before the second instance court), expenses for the collection of new evidence,
47
expenses of the other party and its representative for the additional court hearing, as well as an
additional state fee of 1/3 of the initially-determined state fee. However, this is rarely imposed
because of the desire of the judges for all evidence before making a decision
Imposition of this penalty, however, would very likely reduce the number of appeals and the
associated workload burden that it poses to the court. A substantial reduction in the number of
appeals would make the use of electronic sound recording to record court proceedings a
feasible alternative to the noisy and disruptive typewriters that are used during the court
proceeding to record summaries of these proceedings as dictated by the judge during the
proceeding. Attitudinal changes on the part of judges, facilitated by training, are necessary to
insure the imposition of such penalties.
o. Absence of Alternative Dispute Resolution Legislation
There is no court-annexed mediation program whereby judges can suggest and parties can
voluntarily agree to referral of a case to a well-trained third person mediator in order that
some agreement outside of the court be achieved.
There is a small mediation program funded by Partners for Democratic Change, however,
which provides for voluntary, community-based mediation. The parties decide among
themselves to attempt to settle differences using a mediator outside of the court. The program
has just started and efforts are now being taken to publicize the program and how it works.
Although planned, these efforts have not extended to judicial personnel and, consequently,
few judges are aware of mediation. Court-annexed mediation could be an effective tool to
reduce judges’ caseloads; however, there is no legislative provision for it at this time
 
2. Case Assignment
New cases are given an entry number by court clerks and sent to the Chairman for procedural
review and assignment to a judge. Once considered procedurally approved, cases are returned
to the court clerks for assignment of a case number and transmittal to the assigned judge.
Case assignment is done generally using subjective criteria. The difficulty of the case, as well
as the qualifications and the general performance of the judges, is considered in the
assignment process. Difficult cases are given to better judges, although there is an attempt to
equalize newly assigned workloads (which, when properly done, is a time-consuming
process). Such a subjective way of assignment, however, is open to manipulation (i.e.,
controversial or sensitive cases can be directed to specific judges), thereby undermining the
integrity of the courts as impartial institutions, and leaving them vulnerable to charges of
corruption. In fact, private attorneys in Bulgaria suggested that such abuse of the system may
be happening. This issue is of critical importance in gaining the confidence of businesses
which want the safeguards of impartial courts to resolve any potential dispute. A random
system of assignment, in addition to precluding such abuse, lends itself to the delegation of
the assignment function to administrative personnel. Administrative personnel could also
perform the strictly procedural review of new cases now done by the Chairmen.
The last published national statistics (1997) indicate that the average number of newly-
assigned criminal and civil cases per regional judge on a monthly basis was 25.65; the
average of newly-assigned criminal and civil cases at both the first and second instance level
per district court judge, on the other hand, was 25.29 including firm registration cases and
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10.58 excluding firm registration cases. (First instance relates to trial level cases, while
second instance level relates to cases on appeal.)
3. Record-keeping systems
a. Ledger Books
The Bulgarian courts do not use the equivalent of a single case log or docket to record the
progress of a case. Instead, they rely on a system of pre-printed and ledger-type books.
Because the number of different items of case information that are required to be recorded
cannot be incorporated into a single ledger, there are a series of books, each of which is used
to record a specific set of items. The books are kept by hand and there is much duplication of
entry because the same items of information, such as the case number, are entered into several
ledgers. Within certain ledgers, there are multiple entries for a particular case according to
hearing dates. To follow the progress of a particular case requires tracking the case by these
hearing date entries. Responsibility for maintaining portions of these ledger books extends
even to judges who are required to summarize and initial how they disposed of cases assigned
to them. The maintenance of these books is time-consuming and labor-intensive. Some
examples of ledgers include: alpha book, criminal case ledger, civil case ledger, closed
session ledger, appealed case ledger, execution of sentence ledger, and fine ledger.
b. Files/Filing Systems
Case documents are hand-stitched into the file folder in chronological order of receipt, a time-
consuming process. Paper used by the court for protocols is often of poor quality and becomes
dog-eared quickly; the typing on these documents is sometimes barely legible. Case
documents are put into a case file jacket which is thin, unreinforced, and does not hold up
well with extended use.
Case files are filed according to the date of the next hearing according to judge and separated
into criminal and civil. In order to find a file, it is first necessary to determine the status of the
case using the multiple-ledger system. The file will be either filed according to hearing date,
or be with a clerk or judge who is working on the case. If filed by hearing date, it will be
necessary to sort through a pile of folders calendared for hearing on that day of the month.
4. Computerization
Many efforts are being made to computerize court operations. As pointed out in a report by
the Council of Europe produced several years ago, however, there is no inventory of hardware
and software in the court system and no coordination of efforts or strategy to computerize it.
For example, individual courts (like Varna regional and district courts) have developed
software for nearly all court functions and are implementing certain programs which, in turn,
are being used by other courts. The GOB, on the other hand, has created a Center for
Information Technology and Crime Prevention which began working in July 1998 and is
developing integrated programs which incorporates modules it is creating for each of the
institutions involved in criminal cases including the police, prosecutors, investigators, courts,
and prisons. The Center will later work in the civil area. The Center has not examined the
modules already developed in the courts and it is possible that these already-developed
modules could be used in the integrated model, thereby eliminating the need for the Center to
create new modules. The design team, as well as all judges interviewed, recognize the




5. Recording Court Proceedings
The Bulgarian court system does not require the taking of a verbatim record of official court
proceedings. Instead, the system relies on the production of a summary record called
"protocol." It is typed by a secretary/typist during proceedings in the regional and district
courts.
The protocol includes what a justice dictates to the secretary/typist during the hearing. This
dictating is done in open court and may occur several times during the proceeding. During
witness testimony, the secretary/typist adds to the protocol by typing, either on her own or
upon dictation by the justice, a summary of the testimony. She also will include in the
protocol a summary of the arguments by the opposing sides. The secretary/typist utilizes
manual typewriters. The noise from the typewriters, combined with the judge’s loud dictation
creates an atmosphere much like a "market," rather than a courtroom.
Given the high rate of appeals, electronic sound recording of proceedings does not appear
feasible as the "protocol" is needed for the case on appeal. If the rate of appeal was lowered,
however, this record of proceedings should be considered with transcripts produced only for
those cases that are appealed.
6. Supreme Judicial Council
The Supreme Judicial Council, created by the Constitution of 1991 and the Judicial Powers
Act, is to be the policy-making body of a third and independent branch of government. It
prepares the budget for the Judiciary for transmittal to the Legislature. It also appoints,
promotes, disciplines, and removes judges.
Although the SJC represents an independent judiciary, its power may be limited by the
Ministry of Justice. Under recently voted amendment, but not Presidentially sanctioned as of
this writing, The MOJ will be able to "suggest" nominees for judgeships, promotions, and
disciplinary measures.
The SJC, however, has many limitations:
It has no planning staff and must always react to proposals of the MOJ or Legislature.
It has no statistical department through which criteria for the numbers of judgeships can be
established.
It has almost no ability to reach into the court system to direct the implementation of policy.
Staffing of Council initiatives comes from the Ministry of Justice.
It has no Management Assistance Unit that can work with the individual courts to implement
policy change.
It has no responsibility for training of judicial officers or support staff.
It has no vote in determining the content or parameters for its important role in training
"interns." The MOJ has those implementing regulations.







Elected in January 1997, the current majority party (the UDF) has worked to fulfill its reform
platform; this program’s main objective is to bring Bulgaria in compliance with European
Union standards. These reforms address a wide variety of important public administration,
market reform, and anti-corruption issues, including a privatization program, the reform of the
civil service structure, the strengthening of the Central Bank, support for private, and non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s), and the strengthening of the justice system (including
bodies within the judicial branch, and the police), while at the same time stressing
constitutional and other human rights for citizens. There is also serious commitment to
working towards full membership in the European Union.
1. Anti-corruption Measures
Increasing respect for the law and the institutions vested with its implementation and
enforcement is crucial to private sector growth. If the private sector does not trust the state to
enforce rules governing business activities, investment will suffer. One of the most important
functions of the state is to provide an institutional infrastructure that assures property rights
and enforcement of contractual claims, law and order, mechanisms for resolution of disputes,
and rules that encourage efficient long-term investment. A good judiciary is therefore
essential for market-friendly policies to deliver their full benefits. The presence of corruption
can operate to undermine these efforts. In Bulgaria, the problem of corruption is widely
recognized internally by the Government, by the public at large, and by foreign investors and
the international community.
One of the government’s overriding concerns involves the high level of crime and public
corruption, since it is very aware that all of the desired reforms can and will be subverted or
not implemented if levels of corruption are not substantially reduced.
On September 19, 1997 the National Assembly created a temporary anti-corruption
commission, to determine appropriate steps to establish a successful program to combat
public corruption and strengthen its other public administration reform programs. This
commission issued an extensive report on the problems existing within the Bulgarian, but
party politics apparently prevented the full report from being directly adopted or approved by
the full legislature. The report made several recommendations, including the adoption of a
clear definition of corruption, the creation of legislation to mandate transparency in
government, whistle blower protection for those who reveal government wrongdoing, training
and education of young people in the rule of law and anti-corruption expectations, the creation
of an anti-corruption strategy, greater control within the Judicial Branch over disciplinary and
corruption issues, better coordination between the police (MOI), the investigators (the NIS),
and the prosecutors to ensure the enforcement of criminal laws, the creation of a system to
audit the finances of political parties and campaign finances, administrative reform to
establish civil service controls on the employment and discipline of government employees,
the creation of a public financial register for high-level government employees, the
establishment of internal investigation offices within government bodies to inspect and
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investigate corruption, and the creation of standard and regularized training for government
employees, including on ethical and anti-corruption issues.
The full legislature issued a Decision (which has the force of law) on December 12, 1997.
Among other things, the Decision established a permanent legislative commission to combat
crime and corruption, required the creation of a public financial register for high-level
government employees, required the creation of a unified information system to counteract
crime, and obliged the Council of Ministers to create a national strategy to counteract crime.
The Decision also obligated the legislature to give priority to legislation which would
implement the recommendations of the temporary commission referred to above. The
Chairman of the National Assembly, Yordan Sokolov, has assumed leadership of the
permanent commission.
 
2. "The National Strategy to Counteract  Crime"
Whilst recognizing that "the threatening expansion of crime during the last several years
impedes development of democratic processes, market reforms and Bulgaria’s accession to
the European Union", the Council of Ministers approved on July 16, 1998 the Government’s
"National Strategy to Counteract Crime" (the "National Strategy"). In this it listed general
state policy and goals and a variety of more specific reforms. Several of these specific reforms
address public administration, judicial reform and anti-corruption concerns. The COM
concluded that "solution of the crime problem becomes the highest priority and major task of
the Bulgarian Government".
Thus, the national strategy includes specific plans to combat organized crime, combat
corruption, engender criminal policy and judicial power reforms, reform the criminal code,
reform the criminal procedure code, improve civil justice procedures, adopt a uniform
information system for the justice system, from police through the courts and punishment of
defendants, and improvement of human resources for the justice system, including training.
Specific measures are identified including, by way of example, the shortening, simplification
and acceleration of criminal proceedings; increasing judicial control over the actions of the
prosecutor's office, investigation service, and police; acceleration of court proceedings;
developing alternative procedures to replace slow and costly criminal proceedings;
developing "fast track" court proceedings for certain civil cases.
The national strategy requires the Council of Ministers to organize and coordinate the
implementation of the various parts of the strategy, and to approve a timetable for the
implementation of specific programs to implement the strategy. Each ministry or other
government agency is required to develop its own program. Both the Ministry of Justice and
the Ministry of the Interior have agreed to provide copies of their strategies to the Bank.
3. The Coalition 2000 Report
With the assistance of US AID and some other international assistance providers, a group of
NGOs worked with members of Parliament and judges (collectively Coalition 2000) to
produce an anti-corruption action plan (the Coalition 2000 report). This strategy contains a
platform of anti-corruption measures, including several steps which would strengthen the
judicial branch and other participants in the justice system.
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The Coalition 2000 report also makes recommendations to achieve greater transparency in
court cases and assist in creating a more efficient system of justice. These recommendations
are largely echoed in this report and in the USAID report.
B. Specific Reforms in Progress
1. Judicial Powers Act
In October 1998, the Law on Amendments and Alterations of Judicial Authority Act (or
Judicial Powers Act) was passed by the National Assembly and was vetoed on several
specific provisions by the President. This law will be re-debated and resubmitted to the
President shortly. Under the Constitution, the President will be required to sign the revised
bill into law.
In its current form, the JPA takes several steps towards the judicial reform required by the
National Strategy. It increases the responsibility of the inspectorate within the MOJ to review
judicial branch activity, permits the Minister of Justice to recommend disciplinary action for
judicial branch personnel and to control the budgetary process of the lower courts, splits apart
the authority of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, requires the cessation of criminal prosecution
by the prosecutors to be approved by the appropriate court, formalizes the determination of
staffing needs, promotion, and discipline within the judicial branch, and essentially disbands
the National Investigative Service by sending a large part of the personnel to the MOI and
reserving the investigative function to the remnants of the NIS in only serious criminal cases.
The investigative function in lesser cases will be handled by police for the first time. The law
also permitted the early dismissal of the current SJC two months after passage of the act, and
took some other steps to coordinate the Judicial Powers Act with expected changes in the
Criminal Procedure Code.
The President took issue with several portions of the law. While increased inspection of the
judicial branch appears to be acceptable, he rejected the constitutionality of provisions
permitting the Minister of Justice to recommend discipline against judicial branch personnel
and to control the budget of the lower courts. He also took exception to the disbanding of the
NIS, again based on the constitutional requirement for the existence of this function within the
judicial branch. According to Bulgarian sources, the President will be successful in his
objections to these clauses. It appears, however, that the Chief Prosecutor’s function may be
broken apart as originally anticipated, as a response to the extreme levels of corruption seen
there by Bulgarians. In addition, the police will apparently be given the investigative function
in lesser criminal cases.
2. Criminal Procedure Code
A new draft of the Criminal Procedure Code has just been prepared in compliance with the
National Strategy, albeit outside of the normal legislative drafting process. The President of
the National Assembly asked an informal but highly experienced small group of judges and
academics to prepare a new draft of this code. This document, which is a partial revision of
the old code, was submitted to the National Assembly in October 1998, and it is now being
reviewed by the Council of Ministers (and specifically by related Ministries). The legislature
expects to pass some version of this Code before the end of the year.
This draft takes several steps toward streamlining the criminal justice process and toward
asserting judicial control over various parts of the police and investigative procedure. For
example, advance judicial approval will be required for search and seizure, and approval for
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the detention of citizens will be necessary. A form of plea bargaining is established for the
first time. Perhaps the most important change in the draft is a move towards an adversarial
procedure between the parties, and the placing of the burden to proceed on the party with the
burden of proof. This would change the role of the judges, to lessen their direct participation
in the development of evidence and witnesses at hearings.
3. Civil Procedure Code
The Civil Procedure Code was already revised about one year ago, and moved civil cases
towards the adversarial structure. Another revision is anticipated, after the work on the
Judicial Powers Act, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code is completed. It is
intended that the Civil Procedure Code and the Civil Code be brought into line with all of the
other changes to the judicial system.
4. Law on Normative Acts
The Law on Normative Acts (dating from 1973) which governs the structure and issuance of
secondary legislation and regulations has been amended and a draft of this amendment has
now been submitted to Parliament. As of the date of writing the Bank has not been provided a
copy of the draft.
5. Criminal Code
Another important piece of legislation, the completely revised Criminal Code, is anticipated
to be passed by the end of the year. This legislation has not yet completed the drafting stage.
One of the serious problems facing government participants in the criminal justice process is
that the current Criminal Code dates from Communist times. Many criminal statutes,
important to a modern economic structure, either don’t exist or are arcanely worded. In
addition, several criminal statutes exist which do not reasonably apply under the current
status, and which are being used as a tool of corruption against political enemies. For
example, a policeman who led a raid against a counterfeit music CD factory was required by
the prosecutor’s office to return the counterfeit heads used in the manufacture of the illegal
CDs, and was then charged with the crime of exceeding the scope of his authority. It took a
very public governmental outcry and several months for the charges to be dismissed. A nearly
identical case was brought against a deputy governor of the Central Bank when she sought to
shut down an undercapitalized bank pursuant to her proper authority; it has been alleged that
one of the owners of the bank was a close ally of a highly-placed person within the Chief
Prosecutor’s Office. Clearly, the accomplishment of this goal of the national strategy is an
important key to many other governmental reforms.
6. Ministry of the Interior-Internal Affairs Organization
An important reform has occurred within the Ministry of the Interior, albeit without
legislation. Pursuant to the national strategy’s requirement to create internal investigative
structures to combat corruption, in July 1998 the MOI established the country’s first internal
affairs structure. A high-level council directly oversees internal corruption investigations; the
MOI has successfully completed more than 22 investigations, and has either taken
administrative disciplinary action (including termination of employment) or has referred the
matters for prosecution. It remains for the other ministries, and for the judicial branch, to
institute similar programs.
7. Establishment of Center for Information Technology
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A step has been taken toward the implementation of the National Strategy’s requirement to
establish a uniform information system. While the Government hopes to establish a
government-wide unified computerized information system, it has concentrated on beginning
this system within the area of criminal law enforcement due to the high priority of reforms in
this area. The second step in the development of this system will be to expand it to include the
civil justice system. Without exception, the judicial branch and other government
representatives interviewed by the team stated that this reform is of extreme importance to the
improvement of the administration of justice.
In July 1998, the Council of Ministers established the Center for Information Technology, and
tasked it with developing the unified criminal justice computer system. The director of the
Center is working closely with the MOJ, the MOI, and judicial branch representatives to
establish a plan for the system. It is envisioned that each participant in the system (the police,
the investigators, the prosecutors, the courts, and the prison system) will have separate
modules of computer programs which will systematize and streamline their record keeping
responsibilities. From each of these separate modules, general and non-sensitive information
will be automatically extracted and placed in a general module which will be available to all
government participants in the justice system. This general module would ultimately include
all related court records and information on the disposition of each case. It would permit easy
tracking of cases to determine their current status and the reasons for any delay, as well as to
coordinate and systematize the statistical data on the criminal justice system. It is anticipated
that the efficiency of the overall court system would improve with the development of this
system as valuable tracking information would be available to the courts which would assist,
for example, in locating defendants and witnesses.
 
8. Other Public Administration Laws
Several additional public administration laws are also in the pipeline. Both the Law on Public
Administration and the Civil Service Act have been drafted, submitted to the National
Assembly, and have now passed its second reading. Both are expected to be signed by the
President shortly. The Civil Service Act establishes a distinction between political and
administrative (or civil service) positions, and establishes personnel policies for the civil
service. A public procurement act, which would establish clear guidelines for all government
procurement, has been drafted and is expected to be submitted to the National Assembly
shortly. A government transparency law, providing free access to all non-sensitive
government information, is currently in the drafting stage. This draft, which would also
include whistle blower protections, is expected to be sent to the legislature before the end of
the year.
 
9. Financial Reporting Law
In addition, the National Assembly itself is involved in the drafting of a financial reporting
law, which is required by the national strategy, and which would apply to all high-level
government officials. The MOI has announced that it will require such reports for all of its
employees, due to the sensitivity of their work.
C. Non-Governmental Support for Reform Program
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There are several associations and NGOs which are supporting, or even spearheading, some
of the reforms established in the Government’s National Strategy. The Bulgarian Judges’
Association (BJA), a voluntary group of judges, has supported the legislative reforms
outlined above, and strongly supports the creation of a judicial training center, and closer
coordination with the prosecutors, investigators, and police, particularly through the uniform
information system described above. A prosecutors’ association also exists, but has not been
involved in these kinds of reforms in any meaningful way as yet.
A new NGO was established recently by two important Parliamentary members. The
Alliance for Legal Cooperation is a guild for lawyers who want to support systemic changes
in the judicial branch, including the improvement of judicial administration and coordination
with other members of the justice system. The group also seeks to ensure that changes provide
harmonization with EU requirements for accession and that the legislative drafting process is
improved. This Alliance is actively involved in seeking to establish a judicial training center,
and may join with the BJA to run such a center, if funding can be found for the project.
Another NGO, the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Development, is led by Director Nelly
Ognianova, who also participates as Project Manager of the Working Group on Information
Strategy and as a Professor of Public Administration and Information Systems at the Law
School of Sofia University. This Institute fully supports the creation of the uniform
information system, and further seeks to provide public access to Bulgarian and EU legal
documents, despite the recent loss of PHARE funding. The Institute also supports the
establishment of a training institute for judges, prosecutors, and police, and supports increased
practical education for law students, such as law clinics and practical ethics training.
ANNEX VI
1997 STATISTICS ON ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
PART I - - EXECUTIVE CASES
Movement of the executive cases
Uncompleted before the





Remaining incomplete at the
end of the reporting period
Total (1100 + 1200 + 1200 + 1400) 1000 481,195 49,974 531,169 92,096
a. in favor of the state 1100 142,409 10,294 152,703 28,418
b. in favor of the juridical bodies 1200 145,013 19,793 164,806 30,465
c. in favor of citizens 1300 192,829 19,875 212,704 33,055
d. execution of foreign judgements 1400 944 12 956 157
PART II – AMOUNT OF THE EXECUTIVE CASES










1000 59,823,127,255 94,973,690,535 154,796,817,790 32,920,890,689 11,772,856,444 2,878,194,784
1100 1,637,440,982 162,537,446 1,799,978,428 251,282,754 7,712,752 37,398,479
1200 55,581,980,311 88,956,104,090 144,538,084,401 30,682,070,755 10,618,333,923 2641,114,439
1300 2,457,594,961 5,849,705,314 8,307,300,275 1,986,138,234 1,146,809,769 199,663,008
1400 146,111,001 5,343,685 151,454,686 1,398,946 0 18,858
